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GO WORLD

SEPTEMBER NO.21
OCTOBER 1980



THE ISHI PRESS



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The conclusion of Kato's unsuccessful Honinbo title defence. Reviewing the fifth game are (L to R): Take-miya, Hashimoto Utao, Honda Kunihisa and Kato Masao.

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The cover: A go-playing scene in a kabuki play. Detail from a *chuban* tetraptych by Yoshitaki (1841 – 99). (Collection of William Pinckard)

Go World is published by The Ishi Press.
Address subscriptions to the Ishi Press, Inc.,
CPO BOX 2126, Tokyo, Japan
Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥5,000 (6 issues by seaimail)
Price per single issue: ¥835
Airmail rate: ¥6,900 per year; ¥1,150 per single issue
(Discounts are available for bulk orders by seaimail)

Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first.

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GO WORLD NEWS

Otake Wins Gosei Title

Otake Hideo, Meijin and Judan, defeated Cho Chikun 8-dan 3-1 in the 5th Gosei title match to win his third concurrent title. He thus took his revenge for losing this title 0-3 to Cho last year. Otake has now taken Kato's place at the head of the title stakes.

Results:

Game 1 (July 23). Cho (B) won by 3½ points.

Game 2 (August 1). Otake (B) won by 1½ points.

Game 3 (Aug. 13). Otake (W) won by resignation.

Game 4 (Aug. 27). Otake (B) won by resignation.

Cho Challenges Otake Meijin, Leads 2-0

Apart from his setback in the Gosei title, Cho's marvellous form this year is continuing (his record up to mid-September was 30 wins-10 losses). In the Meijin league Cho finished his games early and with a 6-2 score won his way into a playoff. His opponent turned out to be Kato, who defeated Rin in their final round game on the 14th August. Cho Chikun won the playoff, held on the 21st August, by 4½ points and thus, at the age of twenty-four, earned his first chance at a major title (the major titles are the Kisei, Meijin and

Honinbo and they are distinguished by the fact that they have two-day games in the title match).

Cho had made an excellent start in the series, taking an early two game lead over the defending champion.

Results:

Game 1 (Sept. 10, 11). Cho (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (Sept. 17, 18). Cho (B) won by resig.

In the final round of the league, Sakata Eio won his game against Hashimoto Utaro, thus barely hanging onto his place. Hashimoto, Hane and Yamashiro were eliminated.

Cho Wins Kisei Stage Two

In-between his title matches, Cho Chikun found time for yet another triumph: victory in the second stage of the 5th Kisei tournament. The results in the final rounds of this stage were as follows:

Semifinals (7th August). Cho beat Hashimoto Shoji, Sakata beat Sekiyama.

Final (3rd Sept.) Cho beat Sakata by resig.

Incidentally, since Cho also won his Meijin league match against Sakata, it's nice to see that he finally seems to have got over his Sakata-jinx.

5th Meijin League

Rank	Name	S	K	T	R	C	H	K	H	Y	Score
1	Sakata	—	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	3-5
2	Kato	1	—	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	6-2
3	Takemiya	0	1	—	0	0	1	1	1	1	5-3
4	Rin	1	○	1	—	1	1	0	0	1	5-3
5	Cho	1	1	1	0	—	1	0	1	1	6-2
6	Hashimoto U.	○	0	0	0	0	—	1	1	0	2-6
7	Kobayashi	1	0	0	1	1	0	—	1	1	5-3
7	Hane	1	0	0	1	0	0	○	—	0	2-6
7	Yamashiro	0	0	○	0	0	1	0	1	—	2-6

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.



Otake wins the 4th game of the Gosei title match

36th Honinbo League

Three players have won their way into the next Honinbo league. They are Sakai Takeshi 8-dan, Shiraishi Yutaka 9-dan and Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan. Ishida Yoshio has reached the final elimination round for the remaining place.

Tour by Chinese School Team

Following the tour by a senior Chinese team in June this year, a team of seven Chinese middle school (equivalent to Western and Japanese high school) students toured Japan from the 1st to the 9th August. They played four matches and did not drop a game, blanketing their Japanese opposition 28-0. In fairness to the Japanese side, one should point out that the best Japanese players in this age group would be insei or already professional players and thus not able to play in amateur matches of this kind, but even so it was a very impressive performance by the Chinese.

3rd World Amateur Go Championship

The following participants in this tournament, to be held from the 9th to the 14th March, 1981, have already been decided:

Australia: John Chen 2-dan

Europe: Matthew Macfadyen (24th European Champion)

Sweden: Per-Inge Olsson (1980 Nordic Champion)

U.S.A.: Ron Snyder (4th, Eastern Honinbo Tournament)

Yugoslavia: Peter Gaspari (1980 Champion)

1980 Australian Championships

The 1980 Australian Open Championship was won by Sang Dae Hahn 6-dan of Melbourne, who was Australia's representative in the 1st world amateur championship. Second was Fukuoka 6-dan, a resident of Sydney, and equal third were Akama 3-dan and John Power 4-dan, both of Sydney.

The Qualifying Tournament for the 3rd World Amateur Go Championship was won by John Chen 2-dan of Canberra, who scored five straight wins.

Macfadyen Wins European Championship

For the first time ever a British player has won the European Championship. After nine rounds in the 24th European Championship, held at Mali



A scene from the 1980 China–Japan Go Exchange. Shinkai Hiroko 1-dan of Japan (left) plays Yang Hui of China in the first match of the Chinese tour. One of Yang’s games is given on page 31.

Losinj in Yugoslavia from the 3rd to the 16th August, Matthew Macfadyen of Great Britain and Jurgen Mattern of West Germany were tied for first place with 8–1 scores, but in the playoff Macfadyen, playing the first move on tengen for which he became famous in the 2nd world amateur championship, forced Mattern to resign after 185 moves. The headline in the report in Nihon Ki-in’s ‘Go weekly’ read simply, ‘First Win by Tengen-Player’.



1980 European Champion, Matthew Macfadyen

Other place-getters:

3rd) Moussa (France): 7–2

4th) Van Zeijst (Holland): 6–3

5th) Hasibeder (Austria): 6–3

Corrections to GW20

1. Line two, right hand column, page 4: ‘quarter-finals’ should read ‘semifinals’.

2. Page 6, left hand column: Frank May’s score should be 7–1.

3. Two players were omitted from the bottom of the Judan chart given on page 17. The correct version of that section of the chart is given below.

Sonoda	}	Ishida	}	Hashimoto	}
Ishida Y.					
Honda	}	Hashimoto	}		
Hashimoto					
		Nakamura	}	Ishida	
		Ishida A.			

Schlemper Becomes an Insei

Ronald Schlemper of Holland, who came 8th in this year’s world amateur championship, has interrupted his studies in medicine to become an insei (professional go pupil) at the Nihon Ki-in.

(Continued on page 41)

Special Game Commentary

The 1st Meijin Tournament

1961 - 1962

In this issue we are taking a look at some games from the historic 1st Meijin tournament, probably the outstanding go tournament of this century. It lasted from January 1961 to August 1962 and the top thirteen players of the day participated — all the 9-dans, together with one 8-dan and one 7-dan, the latter qualifying because they had won tournaments. The eventual winner was the 8-dan, Fujisawa Shuko, who just barely edged out Go Seigen. Both ended up with 9-3 scores, but Go Seigen's win in the final round (against Sakata) was a jigo and according to the rules this did not count as much as a straightout win (the Meijin tournament komi used to be five points, with white winning a jigo). The full placings are listed below:

- 1st — Fujisawa Shuko 8-dan: 9-3
- 2nd — Go Seigen 9-dan: 9-3
- 3rd — Sakata Eio 9-dan: 8-4
- 4th — Kitani Minoru 9-dan: 8-4
- Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan: 8-4
- Handa Dogen 9-dan: 8-4
- 7th — Fujisawa Hosai 9-dan: 6-6

- 8th — Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan: 5-7
- Miyashita Shuyo 9-dan: 5-7
- Sugiuchi Masao 9-dan: 5-7
- 11th — Iwata Masao 7-dan: 4-8
- 12th — Takagawa Kaku 9-dan: 3-9
- Hashimoto Uтарo 9-dan: 3-9

(Note: the historical picture has been confused by the fact that the Asahi renumbered the series from the beginning when they took over sponsorship of the tournament in 1976. The original Meijin tournament was founded by the Yomiuri, which continued sponsorship until the 14th tournament in 1975.)

Go Seigen v. Hashimoto Shoji

Go Seigen was one of the obvious favourites before the tournament started, but he suffered defeats to Shimamura, Fujisawa Shuko and Fujisawa Hosai. Here is his game against the youngest player in the tournament, Hashimoto Shoji of the Kansai Ki-in, then twenty-seven years old.

White: Hashimoto Shoji

Black: Go Seigen

komi: 5; time: 10 hours each

date: 2nd, 3rd April, 1962

Commentary by Go Seigen

Figure 1 (1 - 24)

White 10. Hashimoto avoids the onadare (large avalanche) joseki, popular in this period, as his intention is to play a leisurely game.






Figure 1 (1 - 24)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Black 17, threatening to cut at 'a', is sente.


Black 23 is an unusual move. Playing Black 1 in Dia. 1 would let White make a 3-space extension to 4 and leave an invasion point at 'a'. However, White can now ignore 23, as in a sense it is a submissive response to 22.

White 24. White must not play 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, as Black will beat him to the important point of 4.

Instead of pushing through at 1 in Dia. 2, simply descending at 1 in Dia. 3 is better style, but it is still not good, as Black takes the key point of 2. White 3 is a tesuji, enabling him to capture two stones up to 13, but as Black can still threaten his eye-shape with 'a', this result is not satisfactory.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (25 - 71)


Figure 2 (25 - 71)

Black 25 is nicely timed. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 4, Black can erase his moyo with 2 and 4. White 3 is necessary to prevent Black from making a hane in sente.

Black 27 is the vital point for invading. Since it sets up a good continuation one space above 28, White must answer at 28. However, if Black had not played 25 first, White would not answer at 28. He would answer a subsequent peep at 1 in Dia. 5 with 2 and 4.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White 30 protects the corner. If White 1 in Dia. 6, Black lives with quite a bit of profit. White's thickness is marred a little by the fact that 28 in the figure becomes over-concentrated.


Black 33 creates useful aji. If Black simply pushed at 35, White would connect solidly at 33, removing all aji.

White 38 is necessary. If White cut at 1 in Dia. 7, Black would attack with 4 and 6. If White 7 at 8, Black gets a ladder with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 7, Black 'd' etc. White must play 7 therefore, but then Black captures a stone in sente with 8 to 12, discarding his four stones on the left, and next switches to 'a' in the figure. That would be a good result for Black.


Black 39. Black 'b', the usual move, would have too little effect on White. Black is hoping that White will make himself over-concentrated with 1 etc. in Dia. 8.

Black 41. If Black cuts at 'c', White can cut at 42, as the ladder is favourable. Black therefore plays a ladder block at 41. Note that the hane at 1 in Dia. 9 does not work very well when White counters with 2 to 8.


White 42. If White resists with 1 in Dia. 10, Black builds thickness up to 10, as White has to go back to defend at 5. It is better to let Black play 43 in the figure, as White can aim at the extension at 63. Black on the other hand can aim




Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

at extending towards the centre from 39, so the result to 43 is fifty-fifty.


Black 45. Black 'd' would be too mild – Black would have no good answer to White 54.

White 46. White 'e' is just what Black wants. He would then defend the corner with 56.

Black 47 is a probe. If Black plays 47 at 1 in Dia. 11, then after White 2 and Black 3, White would probably extend at 4. This result is not good for Black, as he is left with a weak point at 'a'.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12


White 48. If White answers 47 at 51, Black can regard 47 as a forcing move and go ahead with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11. Since White has no good answer, he switches to 48, which is a severe move. If he made the looser knight's move at 54, Black would make a pincer at 'f'.

Black 51. The response at 1 in Dia. 12 is too submissive. After White 2 to 6, Black's stones would be over-concentrated.


Black 57 is a severe move, intended to stop White from getting eye-space on the side, but it leaves cutting points. Safer would be Black 1 in Dia. 13. After 2 to 4, Black attacks with 5, aiming to extend his moyo at the bottom.

White 60. White wants to get sente here. If he plays at 'g', Black will attack at 'h', expanding his moyo.


Black 63 is a big move. Black could continue to attack with 1 and 3 in Dia. 14, but driving White into his own moyo would not be very satisfactory. A feasible alternative for 63 is attacking at 'i';




Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16


if White 'j', Black could then secure the corner with 71.

White 64. Invading the corner is essential once Black has played 63.

Black 71. Trying to capture the corner with 1 in Dia. 15 is unreasonable – Black will lose some of his encircling stones. The sequence to 14 is forced. Next –

Dia. 16. If Black 15, White captures the stones on the side after 20.

Dia. 17. Black 15 here does not work either. Since Black has to play 17 to win the capturing race in the corner, White captures the outside stones with 18 etc.



Dia. 17




Figure 3 (72 - 106)

Figure 3 (72 - 106)

White 72. The usual way to live is with a hane at 77, followed by Black 'a' and White 'b', but here it would be bad, as Black 'a' would threaten the eye-space of the white group above.

White 80 is an interesting move. If White makes the ordinary connection at 103, Black will attack at 83 and can aim at extending at 100 during the subsequent fighting.

Black 81. Exchanging 103 for 104 now would be bad for Black, the reason being that when he continued with 83, White would be able to make good shape with 105.


White 82, forestalling Black 100, is an important point. White 80 created the opportunity to play here by making Black defend at 81.

White 84 is a good move. If White simply connects at 103, Black will step up his attack with a move on tengen. Next, he would proceed with the sequence from 93 to 97 played later. Without a black stone on tengen, White could capture 95 in a ladder by giving atari at 99.


Black 85 is a ladder-block for the ladder mentioned above. If White connects at 87, Black proceeds to cut with 93 etc.

Black 87. If Black answers at 89, White connects at 87, making the above-mentioned ladder favourable for himself, as the reader can confirm.

White 88. A painstakingly thought out move. Hashimoto has consistently been endeavouring to thwart Go Seigen's plans with clever moves such as 48, 80 and 84, but this time his calculations come unstuck. He must have been hoping for



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

Black to answer at 1 in Dia. 18, in which case he can play 2 to 6, making the ladder favourable for White.

White 92. If White 'c', Black 92 is too big. White is left with the option of capturing two stones with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', but this is too small to worry about yet.

Black 93. Since the ladder is now favourable, Black goes ahead with the cut. White 88 has led to a setback for White, so with the benefit of hindsight one can say that he should have answered 87 simply with White 92—Black 89—White 90—Black 91, after which White could have played a ladder-block near 'f' to prevent Black from cutting with 93.

When Black extends at 101, the defect at 103 in White's shape becomes serious, so White has to try to link up his scattered stones with 102. Note that White cannot capture the three black stones on the left with 'g', as Black counters with 'h'.

Figure 4 (107 - 130)

Black 9. Black cannot cut at 1 in Dia. 19, as White captures him with 2 to 6.

White 12. White breaks into Black's area and lives with about ten points of territory. Omitting




Figure 4 (107 - 130)


12 and 14 would be dangerous, as Black would attack with Black 'a', White 30, Black 'b'.

White 16. If White tried to escape with a move at 'c', Black would attack at 16 and White's future prospects would be uncertain. White 16 and 18, avoiding coming in too deeply, seem to be the best way to cope with the situation.


Black 23. Black 'd' would give Black bad aji as White would cut at 24.

White 24 is better than the crude move at 'd', as it gives White some kind of foothold in the centre. Black has to defend at 25 to forestall the sequence shown in Dia. 20. White loses the sequence beginning with 'e', but this cannot be helped.

White 30. White 'd' would be big, but then Black would swallow up the whole centre with 'f'. Filling in one of Black's liberties is better in view of the fight to come.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21

Figure 5 (131 – 168)

White 40, 42. When White is running for his life like this, the virtues of White 24 in the previous figure become apparent. Without that stone, Black would be able to launch a dangerous attack with Black 49, White 'a', Black 'b'. As it is, White is able to pull off a skilful rescue.

Black 45 is the vital point, but 47 is very bad, as it needlessly fills in one of Black's own liberties. Black should just play 47 at 49.

White 50 is an exquisite move, made possible




Figure 5 (131 – 168)

36: connects: 57: connects

by 47. Black cannot cut at 1 in Dia. 21, as White connects in sente with 2 and 4. If Black had not played 47, White 4 in this diagram would not be sente.

Black 51 is another bad move. Black should first make a sente move at 54, forcing White 'c', then play 51. Because of this miss, White gets another good move at 52.


Black 55. Black cannot cut at 56, as White would be able to link up his two stones in sente with White 'd', Black 55, White 58.

Black 61. If at 'a', White captures five stones with 'e'.

White 62. White succeeds in living in sente. If Black 'a', White plays 'f', Black 'g', White 'h', either connecting or getting a second eye.

Black 63 is necessary to prevent White from playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 22. Black 65 is necessary for similar reasons.

White 68 is a large move, as Black 'i' would be worth seven or eight points in sente.



Dia. 22




Figure 6 (169 - 200)

Figure 6 (169 - 200)

Go Seigen was surprised to find that despite his reverses in the centre, Black 71 was enough to put the game in the bag. Black must have built up quite a lead in the earlier part of the game. Looking back, the turning point was clearly White 88 in Figure 3. If White had played more patiently there (he could have kept sente just by answering at 92), he would still have been in the game. Once Black cut White into two groups, he got too much of an advantage.

White 76. White cannot make the hane at 1 in Dia. 23, as his centre group is cut off and killed by Black 2 and 4.





Figure 7 (201 - 245)
45: connects the ko



Dia. 23

White 84 prevents Black 'a', which would be worth about seven points in sente.

Figure 7 (201 - 245)

Black wins by 9 points.

Fujisawa Shuko v. Sakata

This was one of the crucial games of the tournament. Shuko had already beaten one of the favourites, Go Seigen. If he could beat the other main favourite, Sakata Eio, then he would place himself in very strong contention for the title.

White: Sakata Eio 9-dan

Black: Fujisawa Shuko 8-dan

date: 21st, 22nd February, 1962




Figure 1 (1 - 27)

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko


Figure 1 (1 - 27)

White 2, 4. One of Sakata's favourite patterns at this time.

White 12. This time White avoids the onadare.

Black 21. The joseki Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c' is also possible. White would probably continue with 'd'.

Black 25. The move one line lower is more



Dia. 1

common, but Black wants to play lightly and concentrate on the centre.

White 26. If at 1 in Dia. 1, the sequence to 4 would follow. White does not like this result, as Black 'a' would be sente.

Black 27 is a large point, but playing here now is premature. The three black stones at the bottom left are floating because of White 26, so Black should reinforce at 'e'.




Figure 2 (28 - 53)

Figure 2 (28 - 53)


White first makes the black group heavy by playing 28, then he attacks with the peep at 30, which is a surprisingly strong move. If Black connects at 2 in Dia. 2, White makes a large-scale attack with 3. This way White would be able to dominate the flow of the game.

White 32. If White tries to cut with 'a', Black 'b' sets up two ladders.


White 32 and 34 give White an early advantage. These excellent moves were made possible by 28.

White 36. The even severer move at 37 is also possible. If Black 'c', White would push up at 'd'.

Black 37. Black can see White 40 coming, but if he forestalls it by playing at 1 in Dia. 3, White plays a probe at 2 and it is difficult for Black to



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

find an answer. If Black 3, then White 4 and 6; if Black just makes the hane at 'a', White extends at 6 and Black is still in trouble.


White 40 secures a considerable amount of territory and gives White a favourable position, proof that 27 was premature.

Black 41. Black's only chance is to launch an attack here. If White got in the diagonal connection, he would have no weaknesses at all, so the game would be over.

Black 47 is the honte (proper move), but taking territory with 1 in Dia. 4 might be better, since White has no really effective way of attacking Black. White 2, for example, is no problem, as Black counters with 3.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

White 50 combines attack and defence. The attachment at 1 in Dia. 5 would be too greedy, as Black would counterattack with 2 and 4.

White 52. White chooses to reinforce his group. Answering Black 51 at 'e' would only help Black to strengthen himself with 'f'. (Note that since Black expects White to ignore 51 anyway, it is better to attach at 51 than just to jump to 'f', as this way Black can later capture the white stone with 'g'.)






Figure 3 (54 - 112)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (54 - 112)

White 54 is an overplay which gives Black a precious opportunity to counterattack. The safety-first moves of 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 would have been good enough.

Black seizes the initiative with his superb attacking moves at 59 and 61. White unfortunately finds himself helping Black to build thickness with 64 to 67.

White 68 to 72 are a tesuji for fixing up one's shape. A move by Black at 72 would take away White's eye-shape.

Black 73, 75. Black swallows up the solitary white stone at 54, thus regaining a lot of lost ground. However, White is still in the lead.

Black 81. Black does not want to follow Dia. 7, as the White 1-Black 2 exchange there is bad for


Black. White 4 would secure the whole white group.

White 84, 86. White goes for profit instead of making the safety-first move at 'a'. Since Black separates him with 85, the reinforcement at 86 becomes necessary.

Black 87 and 89 increase Black's thickness. He is still aiming at the large white group.

Black 91. Black has been aiming at this move for quite a while.

Black 97. Black would like to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 8, but then White will counterattack with 4 to 12. White 8 stops Black from getting two eyes in the corner and since White has sente moves at 'a' and 'b', the corner group cannot escape.




Dia. 8

White 102 seems greedy, considering that White already has a handy territorial lead. White would be much better advised to make a reinforcement at 105 or 108. That would give him a firm grip on the game.

Black 105. Black cannot win on area, so his only hope is to attack this large group. Getting two eyes is not so easy for White.

White 112 is necessary to prevent Black from attacking the corner group with 1 and 3 in Dia. 9. White cannot get two eyes.



Dia. 9





Figure 4 (113 - 140)



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (113 - 140)

Black unleashes a violent onslaught on White with 17. Black has no real prospect of catching White, but he will lose if he does not kill this group, so he must keep it eyeless. Black 17 is an all-or-nothing move. Instead —

Dia. 10. If Black played 1, White would probably hane at 4, discarding six stones. White 4 nullifies all of Black's thickness at the top, so this would be good enough for White to win. If White connected at 5 instead of 4, Black would attack around 'a' and would have a good chance of killing the whole group.

White 22. Sakata bitterly regretted this move. Playing White 'a' or 27 would have made better shape and would probably have secured the safety of the group. At this point Sakata had run out of


time.

Black 31. There are too many possibilities for White if Black omits to reinforce here.

Black 33 is an oversight; giving atari at 'a' would probably have finished off White. In playing 33, Black overlooked the fact that White could cut him at 'b' in sente (see the next figure).

White 40 is the losing move, as after Black 41 White cannot get two eyes. White should have followed Dia. 11.

Dia. 11. White plays 1 to 7 in sente, then blocks at 9. Black can cut with 10 to 14, but with 15 and 17 White kills the black group at the top right. If Black answers 17 at 'a', White connects underneath with 'b'. If Black plays 16 at 17, then White plays 'c', Black 16, White 'd', making miai of connecting at 'b' and capturing two stones with 'e'.



Dia. 11

Figure 5 (141 - 183)

White's efforts to make eye-shape are unavailing and his attack on the bottom right corner group also leads to nothing.

White resigns after Black 183.




Figure 5 (141 - 183)

35th Honinbo League and Title

Honinbo League: Rin v. Takemiya

This was the final game of the Honinbo League. A lot depended on it: both contestants had 5-1 records, and the winner would automatically become the challenger.

White: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Black: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Played May 1 at the Nihon Ki-in




Figure 1 (1 - 48)

Figure 1 (1 - 48)


White 12. Usually White approaches the corner from the other side, at 'a', but White 2 and 6 and Black 1 and 5 make 12 more reasonable in this opening.

White 16. Junction point between the right and lower sides. If omitted, Black flattens White with 'b'.

White 24. White 'c' is joseki, but 24 is tighter, and with stones at 6 and 8, White is not worried about Black 44.

Black 27. Takemiya was expecting Black 1 in Dia. 1, but —

Dia. 1. After 4, if Black plays 5, White 6 coordinates perfectly with the overall position. If Black plays 5 at 'a' to prevent 6, he leaves a weak point at 'b' unprotected. Black 27 in the figure was therefore correct.



Dia. 1

White 48. A key move; when White plays here, his opening is a success. Takemiya commented that he should have played here or at 'd' earlier (White 36 and 40), while Black should have played both 37 and 47 at 'd'.




Figure 2 (49 - 100)

Figure 2 (49 - 100)

Black 49. Black dare not invade any deeper.

Black 51. Aims to attack the stones to the right with 91 later.

Black 57. Black could capture at 59 and avoid White 60 etc. but then White 57 would prove damaging to the bottom right corner.

White 58. White thought for over an hour here, carefully reading out the continuation.

Black 67. Black would like to play 1 in Dia. 2, but then —


Dia. 2. White 2 becomes sente. Takemiya was prepared to play the cutting sequence from 4 to 8 and kill Black's entire invading group.

Black 77 should probably be 88.


Black 79. Must be 88. Black expected White to connect at 84, but White played 80 and got sente.

White 88. White now has a clear lead.

White 92. Played to guard against a cut at 'a', but a potentially fatal mistake.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


10: connects

Dia. 3. White should have played 1. If Black 2, White continues with 3 through 13. The subsequent fighting will be highly unfavourable to Black.

Dia. 4. If Black defends the top with 2, White sets up a ko with 3 through 9. He has a good ko threat at 'a' — Black is ruined.

Black 95. Black misses his chance to win.

Dia. 5. Suppose Black plays 1, 3, and 5, cutting off the white group. Takemiya was counting on forming a second eye with 6 and 8, thinking Black would play 9 at 'a', in which case White 'b' would be sente, threatening 'c'. After playing 15 in sente, White could complete his eye with 'd'. The trouble is that Black 9 makes White 'b' gote.




Dia. 5

White is dead. He must therefore play 4 above 5 to link up, but then Black 4 is enough to win the game. Both Takemiya and Rin were unaware of the tesuji at 9 until it was pointed out to them afterwards.

Figure 3 (101 – 152)

White 12. Worth 12 points in reverse sente: compare Black 'a', White 17, Black 'b', White 'c', Black 18, White 'd'. Black may have planned to use 'a' etc. as ko threats, but White outwits him by ignoring the ko (i.e. by not playing 16).

White 52. The upper side group is safe, and



Dia. 6




Figure 3 (101 – 152)

19: ko

White is well ahead, even disregarding the komi.

Dia. 6. If Black cuts with 1 and 3, White plays 4, threatening 'a', and so lives with 6 and 8.

Black resigns after White 152.



The challenger: Takemiya Masaki

Born in Tokyo on the 1st January, 1951. Disciple of Tanaka Minaichi 7-dan, then of Kitani Minoru. Became shodan in 1965, reached 9-dan in 1977. Created a record by taking 8th place in the 5th Pro Best Ten (1967) as a 4-dan — at this time his nickname was 'the 9-dan killer' and he was also becoming famous for his large moyo strategy. Came 2nd in the 11th Pro Best Ten. Won the 15th (1971) and 17th Prime Minister's Cups. Challenger for the 29th Honinbo title in 1974, lost 3–4 to Ishida, but took the title from him in 1976, winning 4–1; lost to Kato the following year. Won the 11th Haya-go Championship in 1978.

Title Match: Game One

White: Takemiya Masaki, 9-dan

Black: Kato Masao, Honinbo

komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

May 15–16 at Chichibu




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 16. Standard in this joseki-like position. White did not even pause to think.

White 20. Correct continuation. White strengthens this group and prepares to invade the upper and lower sides.

Black 21, 23. Now that White has strengthened himself, Black does not mind strengthening himself further. This exchange also defends the corner.

White 32, 34. Another standard joseki position, but here Takemiya thought for 26 minutes. This was the first time he had ever played these two moves. Instead of developing the left side with 32 to 36, he considered playing White 'a', Black 'b', White 37.

Black 45. Similar in intent to Black 21, but criticized by everyone, including Kato himself, as a bad exchange for White 46.

White 48. Perhaps submissive, but White lacked the nerve to play 'c' or 'd'.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White 52 to 66. Most of the amateurs following this game felt that Black had White in real danger and was winning. The professionals, however, took a different view: they thought White was in no danger at all and Black was losing. Takemiya agreed with this, but said he had missed an even better way to play with 60.




Figure 2 (51 – 100) 99: connects


Dia. 1. Takemiya's better way was White 1 and 3. If Black 4, White strikes at 5. If 4 at 'a' to prevent 5, White 4 makes very good shape.

Black 67. Now it is Black's turn to invade White's framework, and White has to be careful in replying because events here may affect the safety of his surrounded top right group.


White 70. White takes a risk in starting this fight. He should probably have played 76 instead.

Black 77 to 89. But the danger passes when Black opts for this small life. White 90 helps the group to the right, and White is more than ever in the lead.

Dia. 2. Instead of living safely, Black could have played this sequence. After 19, if White connects at 5, Black attacks at 'a' in the figure,



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

with the aim of developing a large ko threat.

Dia. 3. Black 1 might also have been better than 83 in the figure.

Black 91. To prevent White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.




Figure 3 (101 - 142)

Figure 3 (101 - 142)

Black 1. Black can see no way to continue his attack, so he turns away.

Dia. 4. If he connects at 1, White slips out with 2 through 10.


White 8. A thick move of the kind Takemiya likes, but White should actually invade the bottom at 'a'.

Black 25, 27. Very big, since they prevent *Dia. 5*, a sequence which Takemiya had not bothered to notice.


Dia. 5. White takes a large profit in sente. If Black 2 at 3, White 'a'.

Black 35. For the last twenty or thirty moves, White has been coasting on his lead, concentrating on thickness and letting Black have territory. With this move, Black finally catches up. The rest of the game is extremely tense.

White 36. White suddenly turns aggressive.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5





Figure 4 (143 - 165)

Figure 4 (143 - 165)

Black 47. Black must be careful in how he lives, because of the closeness of the game. Kato thought for 50 minutes, then apparently made the wrong choice.

Dia. 6. Takemiya admitted that he might have dropped behind if Black had played 1 instead. White 2 through Black 5 are like 50 to 53 in the figure, but now White's strongest attack is at 8 (instead of 13). Black neatly dodges this with 9 to 19, saving his triangled stones in the process. White cannot connect at 'a' because of Black 'b'. He will therefore play 'c'. Black 'a' lives, and Black perhaps wins.



Dia. 6

Black 55. Correct. Black 58 looks like better shape, but then White counters at 57 and Black is forced to surrender 49.

Black 65. Black lives, but not as well as in *Dia. 6* because White 'a' is left.





Figure 5 (166 - 200)

90: takes ko

Figure 5 (166 - 200)

White 66. Looks ahead to White 76, but a mistake, according to Takemiya.

Dia. 7. This sequence instead is correct.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

Black 75. Leads to an exchange that finally loses the game for Black.

Dia. 8. Black should have pushed out at 1 before cutting at 3. White would then be unable to play 7, and would have to settle for something like 4 through 12. This would put Black very slightly in the lead.

White 84. This large follow-through decides the game, although it is still close.

Figure 6 (201 - 268)

White 10. The last move that White spent a long time thinking about (13 minutes). Despite the various kos, Black had no chance to stage an upset in this figure.




Figure 6 (201 - 268)

Ko (at 11): 14, 17, 20, 23, 26. (*At 8*): 33, 36. (*At 11*): 39, 42, 45, 48. 56: connects at 11. 67: connects next to 21. 68: connects between 6 and 8.

White wins by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game Two

White: Kato

Black : Takemiya

May 28-29 at Kita-kyushu





Figure 1 (1 - 32) 27: at 5

Figure 1 (1 - 32)


White 16. Correct choice of joseki.

Dia. 1. Black is trying to force White to play 2 and 4. The triangled stone would render these two white moves ineffective.


White 32. White would prefer to play 1 in *Dia. 2*, but -



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 2. Black steals the corner, leaving White surrounded without secure eye space.

Dia. 3. Commenting on the game, Ishida 9-dan suggested that White play 1 and 3 before attaching at 5. If Black plays 6 at 8, White is delighted to follow with White 6, Black 'a', White 7, Black 'b', White 9, forcing Black down to the second line, so Black answers White 5 at 6. White then gets to play the desired move at 7.




Figure 2 (33 - 63)

Figure 2 (33 - 63)

Black 35. If at 38, White plays 'a'.

Black 41. Black is quite satisfied with this exchange of the corner for a large framework on the lower side.

Black 43. Black avoids answering at 44 or 45 so as not to play towards the strong triangled stone.

Black 45. Leaning on the infertile (because of $\triangle$) right side in order to develop the more fertile upper side.

White 50, Black 51. Professionals have been experimenting with this joseki recently. For another version, see GW19 (p. 55).





Figure 3 (64 - 103)

Figure 3 (64 - 103)

Black 86. Necessary. Without it -

Dia. 4. Black can invade at 1. The sequence through 11 is one possible continuation. Take-miya said he should have invaded here with Black 83, while Kato said he should have defended at 86 with White 76.



Dia. 4

White 102. Besides reducing Black's center territory, White is trying to reinforce his center stones enough to be able to bridge across the right side with 'a'. That would give him a sure win. If he plays 'a' before his center is settled, however, he risks having it cut off by Black 'b'.

Black 103. Preventing White 'c'. Normally Black would defend at 'c', but then White would be free to play 'a', hence the severe contact play at 103.





Figure 4 (104 - 149)

18: connects at (left of 10)

Figure 4 (104 - 149)


White 4. Perhaps 5 would have been better.

Dia. 5. If Black responds at 2, White plays the big move at 3. Black springs his cutting tesuji at 4, but White is safe when he defends the center with 9.



Dia. 5


Black 5. Unexpectedly difficult for White to answer.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If he extends at 1, Black counters with 2 to 8. Next if White 'a', Black 'b'. White is now in no position to play 3 in *Dia. 5* — he cannot withstand the cut from 4 to 8 in that diagram.

Dia. 7. White 1 and 3 here are no better. Black 6 makes 'a' and 'b' miai.




Dia. 7


White 6. White decides to sacrifice 4 and rescue some other stones in compensation.

Black 23. Brilliant. If Black simply jumped in at 'a', White could defend at 'b' and still be in the lead.

Dia. 8. White's correct response is to connect at 1. Now Black jumps to 2, and the continuation through 8 gives a very close game — probably a half-point margin. White cannot play 1 at 7 because of Black 1, and cannot play 1 at 'a' because of Black 5.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

White 24. White cannot play this move either, as subsequent events quickly prove.

Black 25. Makes 26 and 27 miai.

White 40. What if White cuts at 'c'?

Dia. 9. Black connects at 2. White 3 through 11 are refuted by Black 12. Kato may have overlooked Black 12 when he played 24 and 26 in the figure.

Black 47. Loses two points as compared with Black 'd', but Black is far ahead anyway and his primary concern is with safety.

White resigns after Black 149.

Game Three

White: Takemiya

Black: Kato

June 11-12 at Nagano




Figure 1 (1 - 26)

Figure 1 (1 - 26)

Black 1-5. Two games in the hole, Kato reverts to the opening that has been his stock in trade in recent years.


White 16, 18. This type of thick move is one of the hallmarks of Takemiya's style. White accepts gote in return for power that will help him to invade Black's territory.

Dia. 1. The standard move has been White 1, but although White can take sente after Black 2, his position is left comparatively thin. There is Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', for instance. Just Black 'c' is also good. After 16 and 18 in the figure, White has nothing to worry about.

White 20. To prevent Black 20.

White 24. Here rather than at 'a' to avoid over-concentration with 6 and 20.

White 26. Aims at using the thickness created by 16 and 18, but Takemiya criticized this move as being inconsistent with White 24. His post-game comment was that having played 24, White must follow by reinforcing the bottom with 'b', or by doing so indirectly with 'c', in which case White 22 should be at 'd' for a better-rounded shape in the top left. On the other hand, if he is going to invade at 26, he should play 24 at 'a', because White 26 is bound to lead to fighting that will be detrimental to the lower side, and it would be better not to have such a gaping hole between 6 and 20 and 2 and 24.



Dia. 1



Kato counterattacks in the third game.




Figure 2 (27 – 61)
ko: 54, 57

Figure 2 (27 – 61)


Black 27. Doubtful, because it makes White thicker in the bottom left area.

Takemiya: 'I couldn't believe this move. It threw my own subsequent play out of kilter. If Black had just played Black 29, White 30, Black 56, he would have had White in quite enough trouble.'

Black 33. Not Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c',
because of White 60.

White 34. White's first slight mistake in the fighting.

Dia. 2. White 1 through 9 would have been easier. White gets an essentially live shape and threatens such moves as 'a' and 'b'.



White 38. White's second mistake.

Dia. 3. White should play 1 and 3. Black 4 and 6 are forced, and White links to the left with 7. This would be an excellent result for him.


Black 41. This move alters the status of the three white stones to the left from thick to heavy. It now becomes urgent for White to finish

in sente in the lower right so that he can defend the bottom at 'd'.

White 46. Threatens
White 60.

White 48. White's third mistake.

Dia. 4. White should have played 1 and 3. If Black responds at 5, White plays 4 in sente



and lives, hence Black 4. This leads to a ko, and White has a perfect ko threat at 9. If Black continues with 12 and 14, White saves his group and has sente to defend at 'd' in the figure. If Black plays 12 anywhere else, White still ends the ko with 13, and next kills the corner with 'a'.

White 60. May look like a success for White, because he captures three black stones in the middle of the right side, but is actually a failure, because Black gets to invade at 61.




Figure 3 (62 - 100)

Figure 3 (62 — 100)

White 62. Played to let Black capture the three stones to the right on as small a scale as possible. White considered a leaning attack at 'a' instead, but decided that Black would reply at 66, followed by White 79, Black 72, and this would give up the three stones on too large a scale.

Black 63–75. Black makes up for the right side and then some.

White 76, 80. Played to keep Black from

putting 67 into motion, but White is being over-optimistic if he thinks he can win with moves like these. (Optimism is another of the hallmarks of Takemiya's style.) For better or for worse, White should play White 'b', Black 'c', then White 'd'.

Black 81. Stops White from pushing through at the left of 80 and cutting.




Figure 4 (101 - 134)


ko: 5, 8

Figure 4 (101 - 134)


White 20, 22. Double sente, but these two moves give White very bad aji, putting him in shortage of liberties if Black cuts at 'a'.

Black 29. Black quickly takes advantage of White's bad aji.

Dia. 5. If White tries to contain Black with 1, Black trades 2 for 3, then cuts at 4. Black 8 is a savage move. White avoids disaster by playing 9 instead of 11, but Black 10 through 16 reduce his corner to seven points.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. If White plays 1 here, instead of 17 in Dia. 5, Black wins the whole corner.

White 30. Despite the territorial loss, Takemiya wished afterwards that he had followed Dia. 5, since that gives him thickness.




Figure 5 (135 - 171)


51: connects

Figure 5 (135 - 171)


Black 45. Assures the life of the left-side group.

White 58. A tesuji, making miai of 59 and 60. Black had of course anticipated this; he played 57 and 59 as preparation for the cut at 61. He had figured out that even after White 60, he could afford to leave the top right corner undefended.

Dia. 7. If White attacks at 1 and 3, Black defends with 2, 4, and 6. If White 'a', Black 'b', and all White has is a very faint hope of indirect ko. If White 'b', Black 'a' lives.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. If White switches the order of 1 and 3, Black defends with 4 and 6, making 'a' and 'b' miai.

Black 71. White's center group is dead. If White 'a', Black 'b'; if White 'b', Black 'a'. With all the black power in the vicinity, White has no chance of making a second eye elsewhere. Playing 68 at 'c' would not have helped: Black just connects at 'd'. This must have been a highly satisfying win for Kato.

White resigns after Black 171.

Game Four

White: Kato

Black: Takemiya

komi: 5½

June 18–19 at the Yunoyama spa





Figure 1 (1 – 35)

Figure 1 (1 – 35)


Black 1, 3, 5. Takemiya takes a lesson from Kato's success in the third game.

Black 13. Until a few years ago Black 2 in Dia. 1 was standard, but Black 13 has now replaced it in this fuseki.

Dia. 1. The reason Black 2 lost favor was the discovery of White 3, 5, and 7. If Black plays 8 and 10, White gets a good result with 11 and 13.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If Black 1 here, White starts a ko.

White 14. Invented by Yamabe 9-dan. Looks heavy, but –

Dia. 3. If White makes the apparently light jump to 1, Black 2 through 6 destroy his lightness and take considerable territory.




Dia. 3

White 16, 18. White makes a light shape. His group is safe for the present.

Black 19. Most professionals would play 'a', but Takemiya has a flair for doing the unusual and making it succeed.


White 20. Generally criticized. Takemiya said he was anticipating White 'b', or perhaps White 1 and 3 in Dia. 4.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. White 1 and 3 force Black into an over-concentrated shape. Black counters by attacking with 10.

Black 23. Interesting idea. Usually Black makes a three-space extension to 1 in Dia. 5, but Black 23 invites White 24, thus inducing Black 25. However, while other professionals admired the way White directed the flow of the game here, Takemiya himself had reservations, and said that Dia. 5 was more in keeping with his thickness-oriented style.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 5. If Black extends to 1, White will invade directly at 2.

White 32. Aggressive, because it scoops out Black's eye space, but somewhat thin.

Dia. 6. After the game, both players agreed that this sequence would have been more reasonable for White.





Figure 2 (36 - 105)

91: connects

Figure 2 (36 - 105)

White 36. A move Kato regretted as being too passive.

Dia. 7. White could attack directly at 1. Black would defend with 2 through 16. This result is difficult to evaluate, but is probably better than the figure.



Dia. 7 15: connects

Dia. 8


Black 37. Black slips in his punch at 37 before White can slip in his at 40.

White 38. If at 39, Black plays *Dia. 8*.

Dia. 8. Although White captures Black 8 and 10, Black ends in sente and has the potential of cutting off White's center stones with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'a', Black 'd'.

Black 49. A mistake.

Dia. 9. Black should play 1. If White 2, Black lives with 3 and 5.



Dia. 9

Dia. 10


Ko: 10, 13

Dia. 10. White 2 here gives a ko, but Black has a ko threat at 11 and White has none.

White 50. White pounces on this opportunity and the game suddenly becomes a brawl.

Black 57. During the post-mortem, Takemiya blamed this move as a careless mistake, saying he should have captured instead.

Dia. 11. But Kato retorted that if Black had captured (at 1), he would have connected at White 2, then seized the left side with 4. The two white stones above are bird feed. Black 57 was thus correct after all. Takemiya had been thinking White would play 2 at 3.



Dia. 11


Black 61. Threatens 84. White plays 62 and 64 to defend, and the moves through 76 are more or less inevitable.

Black 77. Takemiya thought for nearly an hour about whether to extend here or give atari at 96 or 'a'.

White 80. A crucial mistake, because it lets Black play 83 in sente, then live with 85 and 87. White should play 84 instead of 80. Black would then be forced to run out into the open, and White would have attacking chances for later.

Black 101. Now that Black has lived on both the left and upper sides, White's last chance is to attack Black's center group.

White 102. White plays here to avoid being cut off, but since this gives Black an easy defense with 103 and 105, perhaps he should have played 102 at 103.



Dia. 12

Dia. 12. Takemiya gave this as one possible development from a capping attack at 1. With 1, 3, and 5 cut off, however, White is in at least as much danger as Black.




Figure 3 (106 – 150)

ko: 36, 39, 42, 47, 50

Figure 3 (106 – 150)

Black 9. Black takes the offensive by splitting White into two weak groups.

Black 23. A tesuji.

Black 33. This ko threatens White's life in the lower right center.

Figure 4 (151 – 205)

White 70. This was White's best chance to play 'a' and end the ko. Black would link across at 74. White would be behind, but the game would be fairly close. White 74 would also have been better than White 70, because —

Black 73 threatens 74. Black thus wins the ko and threatens to mop up the entire lower right quarter of the board.

White 84. Necessary.

Dia. 13. If White plays 1, Black plays 2 to 6. Next if White 'a', Black 'b' and the left half of White's group is gone.




Figure 4 (151 – 205)

ko: 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71. 75 connects the ko.

ko (at 89): 92, 95. 97 connects.

Black 99. Black could connect at 100, but he plays for sente, for which he has a good use.

Black 101. Captures White's center. White can take the top right, but he is far behind.

This may have been the crucial game of the series. Takemiya beat Kato at the kind of fighting game that is Kato's specialty.

White resigns after Black 205.

Game Five

White: Takemiya

Black: Kato

Komi: 5½

July 4–5 at Fukuyama in Hiroshima Prefecture


Figure 1 (1 – 30)

Black 1, 3, 5. For the third straight game.

White 14. The ordinary move would be White 17, leading to Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. White defends strongly with 1 to 5. There is nothing wrong with this except for the psychological defect that it seems to be what Black wants.

Black 17. Very large, but the result is about even with Dia. 1.



Dia. 1




Figure 1 (1 - 30)






Figure 2 (31 - 62)

Figure 2 (31 - 62)

Black 31. Starts a splitting attack on the two white groups, but the result is not favourable. Takemiya suggested that Black might have played 31 at 32 instead, or at 60 (forcing White to play 32).



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

White 36. This is why Black 31 doesn't work.

Black 37. Black would like to play 38, but he would lose his attack.

Dia. 2. If Black plays 1, White gets perfect defensive shape with 2, 4, and 6.

Black 43. Once again, Black is forced to give way in order to maintain his attack.

Dia. 3. If he cuts at 1, White turns at 2. Black barely wins the capturing race by sacrificing a stone at 7, but with 'a' and 'b' sente, White's top group is thoroughly alive.

White 58. Tesuji, but doubtful.

Black 59. Huge move. White should have played here with 58.

White 60. Also very large.




Figure 3 (63 - 100)

77: takes three stones

Figure 3 (63 - 100)

Black 63. Turns out to be unnecessary when Black captures three stones in the top right corner. Black should therefore have played 65 etc. first. Kato was visibly upset at the redundancy caused by this move.

Black 71. If Black 'a', White 'b', Black 76, White wins the capturing race.

White 78. White began to feel hopeful when he played this move.

White 80, 82. White is aiming at attacking Black's left-side group with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

White 86. Not 87, else Black settles himself by giving atari at 86.

White 100. Tesuji. Black cannot link through to the right.





Figure 4 (101 - 139)
ko: 8, 11

Figure 4 (101 - 139)

Black 1. After the game, the possibility of playing this move at 3 was examined.

Dia. 4. This is one of a number of difficult variations. The trade of groups is not necessarily favourable to White. After Black 11, he will reduce the right side with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', but his winning prospects are not especially good.



Dia. 4

Black 7. A mistake, because it gives up the cut at 12 and leads to White's answering 13 at 14. Black should just have played 13. White would have connected at 7, and then Black could have lived more easily with 15.

White 16, 18. White is able to contain Black this way because of the stone at 14, which prevents Black from pushing through at 'a' and cutting.

White 30. It may appear that White is trying to kill Black, but this is not so. His aim is to make Black sacrifice a stone at 35, thus obtaining eye shape for his own group.

Black 39. White cannot connect at 37, so Black is alive. If White 37, then Black 'b', and White loses his stones.





Figure 5 (140 - 176)

53: ko. 58: takes two stones. 62: ko.

Figure 5 (140 - 176)

White 64. The deciding play. Black must reply at 66, but then White 65 wins the game on territory.

White 76. Black is helpless.



Dia. 5

4: throw-in left of 3. 5: takes ko. 8: ko.

Dia. 5. If Black plays on, this is the continuation, but White has one local ko threat at 6. After 8, White will ignore any threat Black makes and capture. Black's strongest threat is 'a', followed by 'b', but White can escape with 'c', and still save the other half of his group with 'd-e-f' if Black does not play another move there.

Black resigns after White 176.

(Translated by James Davies)

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1980 Japan-China Go Exchange

In GW10 we presented a comprehensive report on the 1978 Chinese tour of Japan, together with a brief history of postwar go exchange between Japan and China. Since then there have been two more tours. A Japanese team, led by Okubo 9-dan, visited China from the 7th to the 27th June last year and just barely won a majority of its games, with a record of 22 wins, 21 losses, 5 jigo. However, the four senior members of the team, Okubo, Shiraishi 9-dan, Hane 8-dan and Nakamura Shidehito 7-dan, all lost their games with the top Chinese player, Nieh Wei-p'ing.

This year it was the turn of the Chinese to visit Japan again and a team led by Hu Ch'ang-jung toured Japan during June. Although the team included such veterans as Nieh Wei-p'ing (age 27), Wu Sung-sheng (35) and Hua I-kang (31) and the top woman player, K'ung Shang-ming (24), all of whom visited Japan in 1978, it also included three teenagers, who were making their first international trip. The excellent results of the latter are a good indication of the depth of Chinese go.

Nieh, Wu, Hua and K'ung (who is now married to Nieh) were all introduced in GW10. The other members of the tour group were:

Huang Te-hsun (age 30): a factory worker in Chengtu City, Szechwan

Ts'ao Ta-yuan (age 18): a middle school (equivalent to Western high school) student in Shanghai

Chiang Chu-chiu (age 18): a middle school student in T'aiyuan City; younger brother of Chiang Ming-chiu, who visited Japan in 1978

Yang Hui (age 17): a middle school student in Shanghai; the only other woman player in the group, Yang's results on the tour show that she might one day be a threat to K'ung's domination of women's go in China

As the chart shows, the senior Chinese players did not do very well. The top Japanese professionals seem to have taken Nieh's measure and, as in 1978, he was unable to post a plus record. Moreover, in what could be regarded as the husband-and-wife world championship, Nieh and K'ung lost out to the Japanese pair of Kobayashi Koichi and Kobayashi Reiko in the first team match. However, the disappointing results of the top Chinese players were more than redeemed by the performance of the teenagers in their team. Ts'ao, Chiang and Yang demonstrated that they could easily play as professional

Player	7th June Opponent/result	10th June	12th June	16th June	18th June	20th June	22nd June	Individual results
Nieh	Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan: Lost	Ishida Yoshio 9 Lost	Imamura Won	Yamashiro 6 Lost	Ishii Shinzo 9 Won	Hisai 9 Won	Honda 9 Lost	3-4
Wu	Takagi 8 Won	Sanno 9 Won	Takabayashi Lost	Baba 7 Lost	Mizuno 9 Won	Nabeshima 8 Won	Hashimoto Yo- shimi 9: Lost	4-3
Hua	Kudo 9 Lost	Kageyama 7 Won	Futakuchi Won	Iwata 9 Lost	Sekiyama 9 Lost	Ishii Kunio 9 Lost	Sumino 8 Lost	2-5
Huang	Fukui 7 Lost	Awaji 7 Lost	Miura Won	Hane 8 Lost	Tainaka 9 Lost	Hayase 7 Won	Iino 7 Won	3-4
K'ung	Kobayashi Reiko 6-dan: Lost	Kataoka 5 Lost	Nakazono Won	Morishima 6 Lost	Minami 9 Won	Nishigami 7 Lost	Kiyonari 5 Won	3-4
Ts'ao	Kanno 6 Lost	Kamimura K. 6 Won	Noro Won	Ikezaki 2 Won	Yamazaki 7 Won	Nishimura Won	Yamashita 5 Won	6-1
Chiang	Kobayashi Kenji 4-dan: Won	Aragaki 5 Won	Morizaki Won	Morikawa 2 Won	Tanita 7 Lost	Karaki Won	Tanaka Won	6-1
Yang	Shinkai 1 Won	Kanda 4 Won	Tsuchida Lost	Ueda Won	Matsuura 6 Won	Taguchi Lost	Hayashi Won	5-2
Results	3-5	5-3	6-2	3-5	5-3	5-3	5-3	32-24

Note : dan ranks given for professionals only

4 or 5-dan in Japan and in fact they managed to defeat some of the Kisei dan winners. The emergence of young players such as these is yet another sign that Chinese go is gradually drawing nearer to the level of Japanese go.

Yang Hui v. Kanda Ei

This game, from the second team encounter, matches two teenagers. Yang Hui, aged seventeen, learnt go when she was eleven at the Youth Palace in Shanghai. Last year she came second after K'ung in the Chinese Women's Championship. Her opponent, Kanda Ei, is one year older. Last year he won the 3-dan section of the Kisei tournament and this year he came second in the 4-dan section.

White: Yang Hui

Black: Kanda Ei 4-dan

komi: 5½; time: 3 hours each

date: 10th June, 1980

Commentary by Go Seigen




Figure 1 (1 - 34)

Figure 1 (1 - 34)

White 8-28. The Kajiwara joseki, a famous sacrifice joseki in which White gives Black a lot of profit in exchange for thickness. After the joseki is completed, Black aims later at playing out with a hane at 'a', in which case White must be prepared to resist by cutting at 'b'. Since White has stones at 6 and 2, she can undertake this fight.

Figure 2 (35 - 70)

Black 35 is dubious: the key point is 60. Perhaps Black expected to gain sente in the corner, which he would if White played 38 at 'a', and





Figure 2 (35 - 70)

planned to play 60 next. However, White seized the opportunity to take sente herself by just extending at 38, even though locally this is a loss. Black has to play 43, because permitting White 'a' would be unbearable, so White is able to turn the top into a moyo with 44. Already White has taken a lead.

Instead of 35, Go Seigen recommended that Black play at 1 in Dia. 1. If White 2, Black could then go through with the hane at 3 which is his main aim in this pattern. Go Seigen gave the continuation to 19, with the comment that White does not do very well.



Dia. 1

Black 45. Go Seigen recommended exchanging Black 53 for White 56, then switching to the sequence Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' on the right. Black could aim at attaching at 'f' later.

Black 51 is too deep: 53 is still better. When White caps at 52, Black is in trouble.

White 56 is the vital point. White would have no chance of catching Black if she allowed him to play at 'g' or 'h'. White 56 drives Black out into the centre, helping her to build thickness there and also giving her a chance to convert the right side into territory.




Figure 3 (71 - 106)

Figure 3 (71 - 104)

White 74 is a mistake, for Black's cut at 75 sets up an excellent hane at 79 which destroys White's shape here. When Black connects with 83, White $\triangle$ ends up in a strange position. This result puts Black back in the game. Instead of 74 -

Dia. 2. White should connect solidly at 1. Black escapes with 2 to 8, but White is able to secure the right side. When Black plays 10, White attaches at 11 and looks set for an easy win.

Black 87 promptly lets slip the advantage gained through 75; this move is thick, but defending the bottom with 88 is more urgent. White seizes the opportunity to invade at 88, then at 94.

Black 97 is too passive, being the kind of move one only plays when one is safely ahead. Black should fight back with 1 in *Dia. 3*. The result to 9 there would be favourable for him.


Black 99. This hane may be a middle game joseki, but here it is not appropriate. In fact, Go Seigen calls it the losing move. The crude sequence of 1 to 5 in *Dia. 4*, securing corner territory, is preferable.

White 100 is a severe cut. Black cannot resist in the usual way with 1 in *Dia. 5*, as White counters by setting up a squeeze with 2 to 11, then cuts off Black's centre stones with 14 to 20.


Black 101. Black has become aware of the danger and so changes course. However, White 102 is a large move and, as will be seen, it also helps White look after 94 and 96.

Figure 4 (107 - 172)


Black 7. Attempting to capture White with 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5
7: connects





Figure 4 (107 - 172)

in *Dia. 6* is unreasonable. With the help of the peep at 2, White has no trouble living at the bottom with the sequence to 14.

Black 11. Black is trying too hard. He should just connect along the side with Black 'a', White 12, Black 47. Black 13 etc. may look good, but actually this area is almost worthless. White 12,



Dia. 6

on the other hand, is a calm move which prevents Black from linking up and also sets up a large endgame move at 36.

White 18 is a good point which sets up excellent continuations at 58 and 'b'. The result to 20 is clearly favourable for White.

White 38 is a mistake — White should play at 47. Though 38 may seem to be worth more, it actually lets Black play 41 insente, capturing two stones up to 49, whereas White 47 would have given White peeps at 'c' and 'b'. This slip makes the game close, but fortunately for White it does not amount to an upset.

The rest of the game was uneventful. According to Go Seigen, White would have ended up about two points ahead on the board if the game had been played out.

Moves after 172 omitted. Black resigns after White 190.

K'ung v. Kiyonari

White: Kiyonari Tetsuya 5-dan

Black: K'ung Shang-ming

date: 22nd June, 1980

In this game, from the final match of the tour, K'ung's opponent is the eighteen year old Kiyonari Tetsuya, who is one of the leading hopes for the future of the Kansai Ki-in. Last year he came close to getting into the Meijin league, while in July this year he reached the final of the Shinjin-O title.

Figure 1 (1 – 63)

Black 11 is not urgent, as White will not want to play a pincer at the bottom. Black should play at the top left at 'a'.

White 28 prevents Black from attacking at the vital point of 'b'.

Black 31 aims at 'c'.

White 32 is dubious. Kiyonari commented that he should have attached at 1 in Dia. 1 and gave the continuation to 9. White lightly discards a





Figure 1 (1 – 63)



Dia. 1

stone, getting compensation by extending to 9. In the figure White takes profit up to 40, but his centre position becomes thin.


Black 41. Black 'd' would be bigger.

Black 53. Black should block at 54 — White would answer at 'e'. However, White 54 is an overplay — White must defend at 'e'.


Black 55 is a sharp move — White has no satisfactory answer. White 58 is aggressive, but permitting Black 59 is terrible.

White 62 is wrong — White should cut at 1 in Dia. 2, starting a fight. If Black 2, White gets a good atari at 3, then continues with 5.

Kiyonari overlooked Black's severe counter at 63. He had expected Black 2 in Dia. 3, which would give White a sente move at 'a' for later. White is in trouble after Black 63 in the figure.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (64 - 110)
68: connects; 95: captures below 64



Dia. 4


Figure 2 (64 - 110)

White 70 is a large point, but the squeeze to 69 has given Black a solid lead.


Black 73. Black should first exchange Black 76 for White 'a'.

Black 85. Settling the centre with 1 etc. in Dia. 4 would be preferable. This would leave Black with no weak groups, thus giving White no chance to create complications.

White 86 and 88 are do-or-die moves. Black



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

answers nervously at 89, but actually connecting solidly at 1 in Dia. 5 would be safer.

Dia. 5. Even if White attacks with 2 and 4, Black can save herself with the clever tesuji of 7.

White takes quite a lot of profit up to 102, but Black is still a little in front.

Black 103 is a good move, but 107 is dubious. Kiyonari commented that he would have been more worried if Black had played 109 immediately, omitting 107. Giving way at 'b' would be painful, but if White resisted with 'c', the cut at 107 would then be deadly. Since Black played 107 first, White gets the option of making a ponnuki at 110.




Figure 3 (111 - 173)

Figure 3 (111 - 173)

White 124. This large capture makes the game even.

White 30. The exchange for Black 31 is bad for White, as it makes it easy for Black to play 39. Without 31, Black will be reluctant to play 39, as White will answer not at 40 but at 72, giving him a large move at 70 next. Once Black has a stone at 31, however, he can answer 70 with 'a'. In short, White 30 makes Black 39 pure sente.

White 34 is the losing move, according to Kiyonari. If instead he played 1 and 3 in Dia. 6, he would keep sente for an invasion at 5, thus spoiling Black's side territory. Note that Black 2 and 4 are necessary because of the threat of White 'b' in the figure.

Black 51 secures Black a slight but definite lead. Moves after 173 omitted. Black wins by 1½ points.

Wu v. Mizuno

White: Mizuno Hiroshi 9-dan

Black: Wu Sung-sheng

date: 18th June, 1980

Mizuno Hiroshi, born in 1936, was promoted to 9-dan earlier this year, becoming the 20th 9-dan at the Kansai Ki-in. In becoming a professional player, he has had to overcome the handicap of playing in a wheel chair, as a childhood bout of poliomyelitis cost him the use of both legs.





Figure 1 (1 - 40)

Figure 1 (1 - 40)

White 22. If at 'a', Black 37 would be annoying. Fighting starts early when Black peeps at the vital point of 25.

White 38. When Black answers at 39, White realises that he has made an oversight here. If White continues with 1 in Dia. 1, Black gets a favourable ko up to 18, in that it is his turn to take the ko (i.e. after White takes the ko, Black 'a', White 'b'). Even Black 16 at 'c' would be good enough. Mizuno hallucinated that he could win the capturing race by playing 11 at 14. The



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (41 - 86)

wasted move makes this a bad start for White.


Figure 2 (41 - 86)

Black 41. Shiraishi 9-dan advocated pushing up at 44 instead.


White 46. If at 47, Black should be able to settle his group with 'a'.

Black 63. Black would like to squeeze White with 1 etc. in Dia. 2, but White gets a good atari at 8, while the strong move of 14 also seems possible. After 22, Black cannot capture the six white stones unconditionally.

When Mizuno played 68, he felt that White was doing alright. Black has no choice about 69. If he cuts with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, White counters by setting up a ko up to 12 and has a useful ko threat at 'b' in the figure.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

6: connects


Black 83 is an unconventional way of answering White's attempted forcing move at 82. It works nicely, giving Black sente and also securing an eye in gote in case of need instead of merely connecting up the two black groups.

White 84. White could also try wedging in at 85, that is, at 1 in Dia. 4 (over page).

Dia. 4. The sequence to 11 is forced, whereupon Black has the superb combination of 12 and 14. White cuts at 17, discarding his top right

corner group, then attacks on the left with 19. However, he cannot be confident that he will get enough this way.

White 86 is a slack move – White ‘c’ is correct.



Dia. 4

8: ko; 10: connects




Figure 3 (87 – 149)

Figure 3 (87 – 149)

White 92 – 98. These forcing moves make Black get definite life, thus eliminating one of his main worries. White should omit the whole sequence and play immediately at 100.

Mizuno regretted the exchange of White 114 for Black 115, commenting that he should have tried to settle himself lightly by attaching at ‘a’. Even the ordinary idea of White ‘b’–Black 114–White 130 would be preferable.

White 118, 120. White threatens White 149 next, creating two cutting points, but Black refuses to defend immediately.

White 124 and 126 are overplays; White should just defend at ‘c’.

Black 139 is the move Black has been aiming at. If White connects at 141, then Black plays the te-

suji Black 140–White ‘c’–Black ‘d’, getting an untouchable black moyo on the right. White has to answer at 140, but Black is able to capture his top right group with 147. He then leisurely delivers the coup de grace by defending at 149.

Moves after 149 omitted. White resigns after Black 229.

Nieh v. Kobayashi

White: Nieh Wei-p’ing

Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

date: 7th June, 1980




Figure 1 (1 – 44)

Figure 1 (1 – 44)

White 18. The leisurely move at 20 might be preferable, according to Go Seigen.

White 24. Connecting at 25 is the honte (proper move), but White does not want to let Black play at 24.

White 30. The conventional way to play here would be White ‘a’, Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, Black ‘d’, but that would make it hard for White to make territory on the left side.

Black 35. If at ‘e’, White will attack at ‘f’. Black’s strategy is to settle this group immediately.

Figure 2 (45 – 100)

Black 45 is a mistake: Black ‘a’–White 45–Black ‘b’ would make the game easier for Black. Kobayashi expected the sequence in Dia. 1, where after Black 11 White would have to play at 12, thus enabling Black to capture with 13 to 17.





Figure 2 (45 - 100)
81: connects



Dia. 1 16: connects

However, he was badly underestimating his opponent, for Nieh's peep at 46 invalidated the whole sequence in Dia. 1. The exchange to 52 in the figure is a minus for Black.

White 54. If White answers the peep immediately at 56, Black gets a good continuation at 69. Kobayashi commented, however, that he would have found the attack with White 55—Black 54—White 'c' a more disagreeable response to Black 53.

White 68 is a big move, but blocking at 77 would give White better eye-shape and would also have more effect on Black.

White 84 is a useful probe. If Black plays 87 after 85, then White later plays 'd' to live, White 'e' will become sente; if instead Black plays 87 at 'f', he will be left with some bad aji in the corner.

White 92. White's group at the bottom right is not alive yet, as Black can get a ko with Black 'g'—White 'h'—Black 'i'—White 'j'. However, Black's own group is not secured yet, so the fight might turn into a capturing race (semeai). In view of this, Black cannot attack White at this stage.

Playing tenuki with 92 is an excellent idea, but

Nieh commented that White 97 would have been better, since Black gets a good move at 95. White 92 and 94 are not urgent, as even if Black cuts at 94, White can counter with White 98—Black 99, followed by a placement at 'k'.




Figure 3 (101 - 155)

Figure 3 (101 - 155)

Black 1. Black is being obstinate — Black 3 would secure all the corner stones. However, there is some subtle strategy behind Black 1. If White plays 8 at 43, he can get a ko for the stones on the left. However, when Black answered White 43 at 'a', this would secure Black's centre right group, thus enabling him to start the ko beginning with Black 'b'. For that reason, White cannot play 43.

White 8 is unusual, but White's aim is to link up with his four stones in the centre. If he played 8 at 29, the continuation of Black 13—White 25—Black 34 would endanger his centre stones.

Black 19 starts a very risky fight in which one misstep by either side would spell disaster. An interesting alternative to 19, suggested by Go Seigen, is the invasion at 20, which would be more peaceful.

White 42. One of the main aims of White's strategy has been to get in this move. Black 43 is forced.

When White played 50 to 54, he must have thought that he had the game won, for Black's three stones seem lost. However, Kobayashi has a clever answer prepared at 55 — this is the only move that rescues his stones. Nieh must have

overlooked Black 55, for if White cannot capture these stones, he must play White 50 at 'c'; after both sides live with Black 52—White 'd'—Black 'e', then White 'f' would be big. This sequence would make the game very close, so in effect White 50 was the losing move.




Figure 4 (156 - 200)
ko: 73, 76, 79; 81: connects

Figure 4 (156 - 200)

White 60. Getting life with White 63, letting Black live also with 60, is not enough for White, so he decides to play a ko, but this is unreasonable. White cannot play two kos at once, so he first eliminates one with 68, then starts the other




Figure 5 (201 - 241)
9: ko; 11: connects

with 72.

When Black ignores White's ko threat at 80, White launches an all-out attack on the large black group. This is his last chance.

Figure 5 (201 - 241)

White 2 makes another ko inevitable, but White does not have a big enough threat. Black can ignore White 10 because he picks up some stones himself by connecting the ko with 11. He is also able to keep sente thereafter and the large move of 23 sets the seal on his victory. Nieh fought long and hard in this game, setting up ko after ko, but he was no match for Kobayashi.

Moves 242 to 284 omitted. Black wins by 9½ points.

Hua v. Ishii

To maintain balance, we should perhaps give another Japanese win. Here is a hectic encounter from the 6th team match. Ishii Kunio is the leading member of the Osaka branch of the Nihon Ki-in. Hua is generally recognised as one of the top four players in China (the others being Nieh, Ch'en Tsu-te and Wu).

White: Hua I-kang

Black: Ishii Kunio

date: 20th June, 1980






Figure 1 (1 - 73)

Figure 1 (1 - 73)

Black 39. Black could kill White by playing in at 40, but this would leave some bad aji. White would play at 'a', aiming at starting trouble with White 42—Black 39—White 'b'. Black prefers to let White live, since he thus gets good aji.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 44 is the losing move, according to Hua, since White 'c' is more urgent. Living at the top is worth twenty points, but that's still small at this stage, so it should be left for later.

Black 53. Black should play at 55 first.

White 54. White's only chance is to follow Dia. 1. The result there would still make a game of it.

Black 69 is a very severe move. White cannot resist with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, for Black 8 will make the ladder with 'a' favourable for Black however White answers 8. White 70 is therefore forced. The result to 73 gives Black a clear lead.

Figure 2 (74 – 159)

Black 75. Black 'a' would be safer. The thickness White gets up to 94 narrows the gap.




Figure 2 (74 – 159)

Black 141. Black could get a ko with Black 142—White 141—Black 'b', but since he is ahead he plays safe.

Black 153 forestalls the squeeze beginning with White 'c'—Black 'd'—White 'e'.

Moves 160–251 omitted. Black wins by 5½ points.


Some Popular Trick Moves

—and how to deal with them—


Kato Masao

Below are three trick moves which seem to be enjoying some popularity lately. A few minutes study may save you some embarrassment or, if you are so minded, enable you to confuse those of your friends who are not subscribers to this magazine. Before turning the page, see if you can work out both the trick and how to avoid being taken in. Note that the 'trick' may just involve gaining a small advantage compared to the standard sequence.


1. In this variation of the 'magic sword' joseki, White has exchanged 2 for 3 instead of immediately attaching at 4. What is he up to?
2. The combination of 1 and 3 is not really a trick move, but if Black is not careful, White can gain an unfair advantage.
3. White 4 is a variation often tried by the stronger player in a handicap game. Don't let White get away with it.



1. Black to play



2. Black to play




3. Black to play

Trick Move One


Dia. 1. Black is tricked if he plays the same hane at 1 as in the regular version of the joseki. White splits Black into two and has gained from the $\triangle$ $\blacktriangle$ exchange.

Dia. 2. Another possibility is to play in at 1, followed by cutting at 3. However, connecting at 5 is bad, for after White 6 Black is close to collapse.



Dia. 1: tricked

Dia. 2: Black collapses



Dia. 3: refutation

Dia. 4: Black's tesuji


Dia. 3. Instead of 5 in Dia. 2, Black must give atari at 5 here. This completely refutes White's trick move. If White 6, Black captures at 7, taking a handsome profit in sente. Note that if White plays 6 at 7, he collapses when Black plays 'a'.

Dia. 4. If White answers Black 1 by cutting at 2, Black counters with the tesuji combination of 3 and 5, thus assuring himself of a good result. If White plays 4 at 'a', Black makes a ponnuki at 4. The $\triangle$ $\blacktriangle$ exchange is now bad for White.

Trick Move Two


Dia. 1. Black 1 is dubious, for when White gives atari at 2, the presence of the $\blacktriangle$ stone makes Black over-concentrated. Note that in certain positions White might omit 2 in order to retain the aji of an atari at 'a'.

Dia. 2. What about following the proverb, 'extend when crosscut', with Black 1? This also is a failure, for after White 2 and 4 Black is left with an unsatisfactory empty triangle with $\blacktriangle$.



Dia. 1: over-concentrated

Dia. 2: bad shape



Dia. 3: good shape

Dia. 4: good for Black


Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 are the tesuji for the occasion. The virtue of Black 3 here is that the $\blacktriangle$ stone does not become over-concentrated.

Dia. 4. If White continues with 1, answering with 2 and 4 is important. Black does not have to worry about White's cut at 5. White has no eyes and is on the verge of collapse.

Trick Move Three


Dia. 1. One often sees Black block at 1, but letting White link up with 4 is unsatisfactory. Note that Black 3 at 'a', letting White hane at 3, would be very bad.

Dia. 2. Blocking at 1 here is good, but the continuation at 3 is not. White gets a good shape, so his invasion at $\triangle$ has succeeded.



Dia. 1: inadequate

Dia. 2: success for White



Dia. 3: correct

Dia. 4: White collapses

Dia. 3. Black must block White's path along the top with 3. If White 4, he can then cut at 5 and can be very satisfied with the Black 3 – White

4 exchange. Note that if White plays 2 at 'a', Black 'b' is the strongest counter.

Dia. 4. Answering at White 3 looks unreason-

able, because White does not have two eyes after Black plays 3 and 5.

('Let's Go', January 1980)

Go World News (continued)

He was conservatively started at position 38 in the sixty-one member league, but his results for September of 21 wins — 3 losses earned him promotion to 33rd place. The other Western member of the league is Michael Redmond, who is hovering on the verge of professional shodan. His September results were 5 wins — 3 losses (the top ranks play fewer, but longer, games), so he moved up from 4th to 3rd place.

South Korea Promoting Baduk

In recent years the Hanguk Ki-won (Korean Ki-in, whose address is 13-4 Kwanchul Dong, Chongroku, Seoul) has begun a serious drive to promote baduk (go) and Korean professionals have by now visited most major go-playing countries. This year they made trips to two opposite corners of the globe.

Kim Jae Koo 8-dan, accompanied by three amateur players, made a three week instruction tour of Australia in August and September. They began with a visit to the Australian championships in Brisbane and a Korea — Australia match was held on the 24th August. Korea won 3-0, with Kim 8-dan giving the current Australian champion, Hahn Sang Dae, two stones on the top board, and two of the amateurs defeating Fukuoka and Power in even games. (Continued on page 44)




Kim 8-dan in Brisbane, with Australian champion Hahn Sang Dae on his right.



Yoon 8-dan in London (Photo by John Fairbairn)


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro




Problem One. Black to play

Black can save his stones trapped inside White's group by exploiting a defect in White's shape. (6-kyu)



Problem Two. Black to play

With a little thought Black should be able to find a way to secure all the territory at the top. (4-kyu)



Problem Three. Black to play

Black can make a gain by striking at White's weak point. This position often comes up in actual play. (4-kyu)

Pattern 8: The Wedge (warikomi)



The warikomi is a move wedging inside the opponent's one-space jump formation. In some positions, where its relation to a friendly stone makes it a hane, it is called a hanekomi.

The virtue of the wedge is that Miyazawa 6-dan it can often exploit a hidden weakness in an apparently-strong enemy position.






Illustration One: White to play

White has a way to rescue his four isolated stones. The key is the shortage of liberties of the three black stones on the left.




Dia. 1: the vital point

Dia. 1. Attacking the three black stones directly does not succeed. White 1, wedging in at the vital point, attacks Black indirectly.




Dia. 2: White wins



Dia. 3: no escape

Dia. 2. If Black 2, White extends at 3 and Black




Dia. 4: failure

has no follow-up. Wherever he connects, White can still cut.

Dia. 3. If Black ataris on the other side at 1, he cannot connect the three stones after White 2.


Dia. 4. Pushing through at 1 is naive, to say the least; when Black connects at 2, it is all over. White 1 at 'a' is no better, for Black still plays at 2, which is, it should be clear by now, the vital point.




Problem One: Black to play

The black stones isolated deep inside the enemy position are by no means trapped.

Dia. 1. The crude atari at 1 leads nowhere. If Black 3, White follows him out with 4 and has enough liberties to win the fight.




Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: hanekomi

Dia. 2. Once again attacking indirectly is the answer. Black 1, a hanekomi, does the trick.

Dia. 3. If White 2, Black 3 puts two white stones in atari, but White cannot connect at 'a' because of Black 'b', so White is helpless. This




Dia. 3: success



Dia. 4: snapback


shows the advantage of the indirect attack at 1 in Dia. 2 over the crude atari in Dia. 1, which actually gave White more flexibility in answering.

Dia. 4. White cannot save his two stones, so drawing back at 1 is his best answer. Black thus gets a snapback at 2. In short, Black 1 in Dia. 2 made miai of Dias. 3 and 4.




Problem Two: Black to play and take maximum profit at the top.


Dia. 1. If Black attaches at 1, hoping to connect along the side, White captures with 2 to 8 and gets a live group at the top. This is the reverse of the desired result.




Dia. 1: failure



Dia. 2: warikomi



Dia. 3: success



Dia. 4: White dies

Dia. 2. The wedge at 1, threatening to cut, is the tesuji.

Dia. 3. White has no choice but to answer at 2, so the contact play at 3 now works. Black secures a fair amount of territory at the top.

Dia. 4. This time White cannot live at the top. White 1 to 9 are the best moves he has, but his efforts are rendered futile by the placement at 10.





Illustration Two: White to play


Black's position looks shaky. White should have his eyes on the four pivotal black stones.

Dia. 1. The clamp (hasamitsuke) of White 1 is a common tesuji, but it is not the answer here. Black connects at 2, then slips through White's fingers with the aid of the ataris at 4 and 6.




Dia. 1: Black escapes

Dia. 2 (next page). White starts with the atari at 1, followed by an atari on the outside at 3. This is a clever tesuji which dooms Black.




Dia. 2: the tesuji




Dia. 3: finis

Dia. 3. There is no escape. The successive ataris give Black no time to catch his breath.




Problem Three: Black to play and exploit a defect in White's shape.

Dia. 1. If Black 1, White will of course answer cautiously at 2. The sequence to 4 does leave White looking a little fragile, without good eye potential, but all the same Black can do better.




Dia. 1: inadequate




Dia. 2: the vital point

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the severest move. Attaching instead at 'a' is also possible, but Black 1 is more effective.

Dia. 3. White must answer at 2 (to avoid the



Dia. 3: central thickness



Dia. 4: the corner falls

result in Dia. 4), so Black cuts off a white stone and builds considerable thickness. This is an excellent result for Black and in most cases would be satisfactory. However, one should note that in some positions Black might prefer to follow Dia. 1 if he had good prospects of attacking and killing the entire white group.

Dia. 4. If White answers the warikomi by giving atari at 1, Black 2 is a perfect follow-up, enabling Black to cut off and kill the corner stones. White has no answer to Black 2, which is why he has to follow Dia. 3.

(*'Gekkan Go'*, August 1978)

(*Continued from page 41*)

Incidentally, all four members of the Korean party were surnamed Kim.

Another party of four Koreans, this one including two professionals — Yoo Ki Hyun 8-dan and Jung Chang Hyun 7-dan — visited Europe, also in August. According to a report from England, they visited London on the 22nd August and took on all comers in simultaneous exhibitions. The amateur members of the group were Kim Jung Hack 4-dan, the Activities Manager of the Hanguk Ki-won, and Soo Jeon Oh, President of the Sun Myung Enterprise. This was the first official visit by Korean professionals to the United Kingdom.


Cho 8-dan Completes Clean Sweep of Korean Titles

Cho Hun Hyen 8-dan has secured a complete monopoly on the eight professional titles in Korea by winning the Korean Meijin title in July. Cho, a disciple of Kitani Minoru, played in Japan until he was 5-dan and is known there as So Kungen. He visited the European Go Congress last year.

The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan

How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. Three proposals are being made for Black's next move; which one fits this opening best? White has just played the triangled stone.




Dia. 1


A: Black has strong influence in this general area, so he should play aggressively and try to keep White off balance. The contact play at 1 in Dia. 1, denying White the corner, is the most severe move. White has no eye space and must travel out into Black's area of strength.

B: All Black's other stones are oriented toward the center, so to be consistent, Black should keep playing in that direction. I suggest the large knight's move at 1 in Dia. 2. Black shouldn't try to chase White out into the open; that is exactly where he should try to discourage White from going.

C: I agree with B's general thinking, but I can't see how his large knight's move plays toward the center. Playing toward the center means playing upward — with Black 1 in Dia. 3. This angle tesuji fits Black's opening strategy perfectly.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Fuseki Analysis



Fuseki Analysis

One's choice of joseki should be adapted to the two adjacent corners, in this case the top right and bottom left corners.

Top right. The two circled stones, reaching toward the center and pressing White down, give Black considerable influence over the right side and in the center. Black would like to develop this influence.

Bottom left. Black's influence here too is directed outward, but toward the left side and center. White's circled stone makes it very difficult for Black to develop the lower side into territory.


From this it follows that Black should choose a move that stresses the right side and center. The bottom of the board is worthless.

B Wins the Debate


Dia. 1. The large knight's move at 1 is the correct choice. However, it is not so much this move itself that is the key as the move that comes after it, after White slides in to 2. If you failed to guess Black 1, see now if you can guess Black 3 before reading the following joseki discussion.

Dia. 2. First, although not mentioned in the debate, the most common move in this position is probably the small knight's move at Black 1. White usually replies by sliding into the corner at 2 and Black extends to 3. Next 'a' is a key point for both sides.


Dia. 3. By comparison, if Black makes the



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


large knight's move at 1, he can extend a line further with 3. This is one of the features of the large knight's move. Balancing it is the fact that Black's position is thin; White can invade at 'a'.

Dia. 4. If White invades at 1, Black can reply with 2 to 8, or —


Dia. 5. He can block directly at 2 and force with 4, sacrificing a stone in order to take sente. In either case, White gets the corner.




Dia. 4




Dia. 8




Dia. 9
2: elsewhere




Dia. 5




Dia. 10




Dia. 11




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

Dia. 6. This diagram shows another feature of the large knight's move. When White slides in at 2, instead of extending along the lower side, Black can contain him from the center with 3. The containment may seem loose, but if White tries to force his way out, he will only strengthen Black's position. In general, White will do nothing, leaving the next move to Black. Where should Black play?


Dia. 7. One good move is the knight's move at 1, tightening the net and preparing to attack at 'a'.

Dia. 8. Or Black can attack at 1 directly. If White ignores this –


Dia. 9. Black 3 is a strong follow-up attack, which also eliminates the invasion at 'a'. If White continues to ignore Black –

Dia. 10. He dies.

Dia. 11. White had better defend at 1, but his troubles are not over. Black has a choice of two



Dia. 14



Dia. 15


tesujis to play next: 'a' or 'b'.

Dia. 12. If he starts at 1 –

Dia. 13. He can take the corner, while White just barely lives with 10 and 12. This gives Black a nice profit, although it leaves him a little thin at points like 'a' and 'b'.


Dia. 14. Black's second tesuji is the attachment at 1. White 2 and 4 are best, but –

Dia. 15. Black cuts at 5, gaining tremendous thickness, although less profit than in Dia. 13.



Dia. 16

Dia. 16. After the foregoing discussion, it should not be hard to guess that Black will answer White 2 at 3. A more ideal setting for this move could hardly be imagined. It ties all of Black's stones together, brings his outer influence to life, and creates such vast potential that the rest of the game should be easy. White will probably extend to 4 (or 'a'), but Black can match this with any of several good replies: 'b', discussed above, or 'c', attacking the two white stones in



Dia. 18

the top right, or 'd', capping the left side.


Black should not play 3 at 'e'; recall the relative worthlessness of the bottom area.

Dia. 17. Black 3 here would also be good. If Black can continue at 'a', 3 makes a stronger shape than 'b'; White has less chance to invade and the right side is more likely to end up as black territory. It is difficult to choose between Dias. 16 and 17.


Dia. 18. To avoid being contained, White may answer Black 1 by jumping out to 2, but Black welcomes this because it lets him make territory while attacking. First forcing at 3 to protect the bottom, he pursues White with 5 and 7. If White slides in to 'a', Black should respond immediately at 'b', threatening 'c', as in Dias. 14 and 15.

Dia. 19. White may decide to invade the right side with 2. If Black plays 3 to keep him from linking up at 'a', White can extend two spaces to 4. Black retaliates, however, by robbing White's lower group of eye space and taking the corner profit with 5. After White 6 to 10, Black can extend to 11 on the left side. White has little territory and many weak stones, and the game looks interesting for Black.


Dia. 20. Finally, White can answer Black 1 with the contact play at 2 and settle his shape with 4 and 6. Black 'a' and 'b' now have less effect on the white group, so Black cannot so easily make territory on the right side. But



Dia. 17




Dia. 19




Dia. 20

Black's group also has a settled shape, so he can switch to 7. Getting this large point makes his opening satisfactory.


Dia. 21. Black's shape may not look settled — what if White attacks at 1? — but Black can even ignore White 1. Next if White plays 'a', Black plays 'b', and vice versa; either way, Black maintains good shape.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22




Dia. 23


Dia. 22. Let's take a brief look at the other two proposals in the debate. The first was the attachment at Black 1. White 2 is the usual reply (White 'a' is an alternative), and Black should block at 3.

Dia. 23. White 4 through Black 7 finish the joseki.

Dia. 24. This joseki does not relate very well, however, to the opening under debate. After Black 7, White invades the right side at 8. Black must play 9 to keep White from linking under at 'a'. White now pushes ahead with 10 etc. Extending at 16 gives this group a strong shape — compare Dia. 19 — and 11, 13, and 15 do Black little good because of the triangled stone. Black tries to attack the right side with 17, which is also necessary for defense, but White 18 threatens 'b', which would settle White nicely, and if Black stops that with 'c', then White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f' gets White out into the clear.




Dia. 24



Dia. 25

Dia. 25. The last proposal was Black 1 in this diagram. White 2 is the usual response, and Black can answer at 3 or 5. Black 3 is the easier move, and the result it leads to, with White shut in, works extremely well in this opening. This is just as good for Black as anything in Dias. 16 to 20.



Dia. 26

Dia. 26. But in this particular situation, White has a simple reply to Black 1. He pushes straight out with 2, 4, and 6. Ordinarily he wouldn't want to push Black along the fifth line like this, but here White $\triangle$ takes care of any potential territory formed by 1, 3, and 5. After 6, White 'a' and 'b' are miai and Black's opening is in ruins.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'*, August 1980. Translated by James Davies.)

From Amateur to Professional

Tomita Tadao 7-dan

Tei Meiki, the younger brother of Tei Meiko who appeared in the last issue, arrived in Japan together with his brother in May 1978 at the age of thirteen. He therefore made the fourth boy from Taiwan to become a live-in pupil at my house. Whereas his brother studies very seriously, Tei Meiki likes to play and is an active boy with a lot of friends. Also unlike his brother, he dislikes studying games on his own. Although their characters are completely different, the two brothers get along very well. Rather than study a game, Tei Meiki likes to challenge his brother to one.

When Tei Meiki came to Japan and became an insei at the Nihon Ki-in, he was placed at number twenty-five in the insei league, but after a year he seemed to be showing few signs of making any progress, rising only to number twenty-two. By contrast, his brother had entered the league

at number fifteen and in short order had become number one and then a shodan. This month's topic, then, will be to see if we can account for Tei Meiki's lack of advancement by looking at three of his games. The first two, one at four stones played just after arriving in Japan and the other at three stones played about a year later, will be compared for changes in his style of play as well as to try to account for a dampening of his youthful vigor. The final game is a recent one played about a year after the second one and is from an insei tournament.

Game 1

Black: Tei Meiki

White: Tomita

Handicap: four stones

June 15, 1978





Figure 1 (1 - 30)


Figure 1 (1 - 30)

Asked about the joseki in diagram 1 where Black blocks at 2 instead of at 8 in the figure, Tei replied that he didn't like it because White had too many ways to play afterwards.

Up to Black 16 is a simple and direct way of playing and is probably good for a four-stone handicap game. The order of the cut at 14 is important. If Black neglects to play it now, after White plays sagari at 'a', he loses it, for if he tries to cut after the white sagari, White will answer at 'b', not at 15. For White's part, he can make the diagonal connection at 'b' instead of the solid one at 13, but if he does, when Black pushes at 16, he has to answer at 22. White connects solidly at 13 to keep from losing sente.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

In place of 18 in the figure, the sequence to 7 in diagram 2 leaves Black with no cause for complaint. Tei's comment: "I played the blocking extension of 18 because I found the white extension to 4 in diagram 2 disagreeable. Nevertheless, diagram 2 is correct, isn't it?"



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

For White 19 the attachment and cut in diagram 3 may also come to mind. This would create a sabaki shape, but in general the purpose of sabaki is to make it easier to take care of stones in trouble, so it is not usually a method of attack. In a four-stone game I did not want to go around from the beginning just making stones safe.

As an illustration, should Black try to capture the marked white stone in diagram 3 with the atari at 'a', there would be no problem, but he is more likely to bury White at the bottom with the ordinary sequence to 9 in diagram 4.


I jumped out to 19 in the figure not so much because diagram 4 is unacceptable for White, but because I dislike completely settled positions.



Dia. 5

Defending with Black 20 was natural and if Black answered White 21 with 2 in diagram 5, I was going to lose no time playing 3, but instead, he tried to put the lid on from above with 24, 26, and 30. Before attacking, however, Black played a forcing move at 22, but he would have done better to hold this exchange in reserve since he lost the option of extending out at 'c', a move which would have had a stronger impact on

White's center stones. With the marked stone in diagram 6 in place, Black can completely seal White in with the sequence to 5 or even, if he chooses, aim at the sequence Black 1, White 2, Black 4.



Dia. 6





Figure 2 (31 - 54)

Figure 2 (31 - 54)

With 32 Black once again tried to force White down. Tei's explanation: "Even though I hadn't read the move out, this is the way I wanted to play."

White 35 should have been left unplayed. When Black resisted with 36, White's position started to look thin around 'a'. After White's turn at 37 the sequence continued to 50, at which time White had to play 51 to guard against Black 'a'.



Dia. 7

Black 52 was greedy, as well as proof of Tei's lack of reading. This move must be at 'b' in order to ensure the capture of the white stones. That Black's hane at 52 has no effect on the white group can be seen in diagram 7, where, after the exchange of 53 and 54 in the figure, White

gets a ko. Nevertheless, despite this loss, the power of four stones in a four-stone game is such that Black would still be in command with two moves at the top.

Without giving the rest of the moves, I would like you to take note of Black's positive way of playing. Yet, because this aggressiveness was not backed up by reading, Tei's failures in his games were frequent, so that he lost all confidence. How dispirited his go became will become clear after looking at a game played a year later.

Game 2

Black: Tei

White: Tomita

Handicap: 3 stones

April 16, 1979






Figure 1 (1 - 31)

Figure 1 (1 - 31)

Although Black's two-space jump to 4 in answer to White's two-space pincer at 3 is fine, Black's play to 12 against 5 and 7 offers no resistance whatsoever and would never be seen in professional play. The reason can be found in diagram 1 where White has played the high pincer instead of the low one. When White grasps the black stone with 1, Black 2 decides the fate of




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

the white stone and the positions are equal. However, in the figure Black has no way to capture White 3 cleanly in one move after White 13, so that no matter how he plays, his position will never be as good as the black one in diagram 1. In short, he cannot allow White such an advantage, so instead of 8 in the figure, he should attach at 1 in diagram 2, the exchange to 5 constituting a joseki. If White extends up to 3, then Black connects at either 2 or 'a'. Tei's excuse: "I didn't know the joseki, so I was playing without worrying too much."




Dia. 3

Since there are lots of possibilities in go, even the pullback at 8 is playable provided that one understands that the black stone at 4 cannot be given up. After Black pulls his stone out with 1 and 3 in diagram 3, 5 and 7 become the vital points and a difficult fight ensues. This fight is unavoidable once Black has pulled back to 8 in the figure, but since this article is not a course in joseki, I will make my explanation brief and merely give one possible continuation.


After Black 7 in diagram 3, White connects at 1 and Black jumps out to 2 in diagram 4. After White 5 and 7 Black is forced to connect at 8. Later, if Black omits 14, White will play there himself and Black's position will fall apart. Whether the result to 14 is good or bad naturally depends on the positions in the adjoining corners, but the essential point to grasp here is that after Black draws back with 8 in the figure, he cannot discard his stone at 4.

After Black 7 in diagram 3, White connects at 1 and Black jumps out to 2 in diagram 4. After White 5 and 7 Black is forced to connect at 8. Later, if Black omits 14, White will play there himself and Black's position will fall apart. Whether the result to 14 is good or bad naturally depends on the positions in the adjoining corners, but the essential point to grasp here is that after Black draws back with 8 in the figure, he cannot discard his stone at 4.

Although Black 14 is a big point and not a mistake, I would prefer to see him show more spirit by attacking the lone white stone with 1 in diagram 5. White will no doubt play 2 and 4, making territory on the side, since trying to escape with 2 at 'a' would only subject him to a



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

one-sided attack. Black could then vigorously push up at 5 and swallow the white stone whole. Tei suggested Black 'b' for 5, but this would allow White to take the key point of 5. This hardly seems the idea of an energetic youth.

Black 16 turned out to be the most problematic move of the game. If Black wants to attack at the bottom, he should go as far as 'a'. With 16 he cannot expect to get a satisfactory attack going because White can easily look after his stones by attaching at 'a'. Moreover, it is weak-spirited and does White's bidding to play in this area after White has made a two-space extension. No reason exists to play such a tight move as Black 16. If a player takes the attitude that in a three-stone handicap game it is all right to play a little tightly, he disqualifies himself as an aspiring professional. If one wonders where the fighting spirit of the previous four-stone game has gone, I can only say that loss of confidence is a terrible thing.

Instead of blocking at 24, Black should jump out to 1 in diagram 6. If White 2, then Black answers with 3 and 5. He does not wedge in with 3 at 4, which would allow White to connect underneath as in the figure. If White plays 2 at 4, Black counters with the clever attachment at 'a' which



Dia. 6

affects the white position above.

The cap at 30 in figure 1 is probably the only move. The simple answer would be for White to settle his stones with the attachment at 'a', but I decided to test Tei's strength by playing 31 from above.





Figure 2 (32 - 73)


Figure 2 (32 - 73)

Black 32 is a severe attack, but instead of 36, Tei wished he had cut at 39, the cut leading to the sequence in diagram 7. In this diagram White has no other way to play, so after cross-cutting with 8 and 10, he must sacrifice his stones at the bottom.



Dia. 7

Tei, when he saw Black 46 now, looked displeased and remarked that the sagari at 46 was pointless and that he should have jumped down at 51. Up to 51 in the figure White has gained nearly ten points of territory and has connected to his group on the left. This is a failure for Black.



Dia. 8

After Black took the big points at 52 and 54, I started the second round with the attachment at 55. Black 58 and after are a kind of tesuji and Black's play up to 72 is without any serious errors. Instead of 58, Black could also have played as in diagram 8.

The shoulder hit at 73 is the beginning of the last round and once again Black's timidity was evident, thereby prolonging the game. White's thinking at this point is that if he gets a small life in the upper right corner, a huge black moyo will develop from the upper side into the center; therefore, the usual move would be the cap at 'a' to reduce this moyo potential. Plunging all the way in to 73, then, was another test of Tei's strength.




Figure 3 (74 - 112)

Figure 3 (74 - 112)

Answering underneath at 74 is a weak move. With strength on both sides Black must attack White from above with 'a'. If White plays down at 74, then Black attacks at 75; if White jumps out to 75, then Black attacks from above at 81. In either case, Black is attacking hard and White will be hard pressed to survive.

White 91 was played with Black's shortage of liberties in mind, but it would have been five points better to have played at 'b'. Up to 111 White escapes into the center while laying waste to the upper side, while on the right he has traded the side for the corner. The game has now become close.




Figure 4 (113 - 162)

Figure 4 (113 - 162)

From Black 46 to White 53 Black is able to get a sente seki. This is big and it decides the game. Instead of Black 58 and 60, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 61 would have been better.

Moves after 162 omitted. Black wins by 5 points.

Recently a preliminary tournament was held at the Nihon Ki-in to choose four players from among insei number eleven to number thirty to participate in the main tournament for promotion to shodan. As insei number twenty Tei placed third with a record of sixteen wins and three losses, thereby qualifying for a place in the main tournament. The following game is Tei's last game from the preliminary tournament and the comments are his own.

Game 3

Black: Tei

White: Miss Y, insei

Komi: 5½
January 20, 1980




Figure 1 (1 - 109)

Figure 1 (1 - 109)

Black 35 at 39 would have been better.

A white blocking extension to 'a' with either 36 or 38 would have been a good move.

I thought White would play 40 at 'b'.

White should probably jump to 53 with 48.

Black's cap at 53 puts White into trouble.

58 and 60 leave White in a painful position; 58 is better at 'c'.

Instead of the white connection at 78, the cut at 79 seems to be the move. White suffers a large loss when Black captures four stones with the moves up to 85.


I was afraid that White would extend to 105 instead of answering at 92.

White seems to be too conscious of the komi, so her play is too negative.


Moves after 109 omitted. White resigns.

('Gekkan Gogaku', April 1980. Translated by Dave Thayer.)


Sacrifice Tesuji Problems



1. Black to find the most effective way to squeeze White.



2. Black can use the ▲ stones to settle the shape here.




3. White to play and live.


Answer to Problem One

This problem involves a famous sacrifice tesuji which should be known to kyu players of all levels.

Dia. 1. The first step is the hane at 1, followed by the cut at 2.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. The crucial move comes when White captures at 4. Black must increase the sacrifice to two stones.

Dia. 3. Black not only forces with 7 but also gets an additional squeeze with 9 and 11. This result is a great success.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 4. Compare the unsatisfactory result when Black just forces with 1 here. This move is bad style, leaving Black's wall full of holes.

Answer to Problem Two


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the key point.

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black sacrifices three stones with 3, enabling him to force with 5.


Dia. 3. After giving atari at 7, Black protects his cutting point with 9 and has every reason to




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

be satisfied.


Dia. 4. The blunt forcing moves of 1 and 3 are bad. After 4, White is left with a connection at 'a'.

Answer to Problem Three

Dia. 1. White's only move is blocking at 1. The problem is the continuation.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White must answer Black 2 by capturing at 3. Black must give atari at 4.

Dia. 3. White ataris at 5, then captures three stones with 7.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. The point of the exercise is that Black must now capture at 8, thus letting White make two eyes with 9. If Black plays in at 9, White gives atari at 'a' and Black cannot connect because of the presence of the Δ stone.

(From a supplement to 'Gekkan Gogaku', April 1980)

Odd Man Out

Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan and James Davies


Problem. In each group of endgame moves below, three have the same value but one differs, either in size or in sente-gote attributes. Find the odd man out.

Example. Group 1, move A.


Dia. 1. Black plays first. Black 1 is sente, or at least if White omits 2, Black gains another point by playing there.

Dia. 2. White plays first. White 1 and 3 can be considered gote.

The difference is one point (x), so Black 1 is worth one point in (one-sided) sente. Two of the




Dia. 1




Dia. 2


other three moves (Black B, C, and D) are also worth one point in sente, but one is different. The odd man out is —?




Group 1. Black to play



Group 2. Black to play



Group 3. Black to play



Group 4. White to play


Solutions

Group 1. The odd man out is C.


A. 1 point in sente

As shown on the previous page.

B. 1 point in sente




Black plays first




White plays first

Black 1 is sente, White 1 is gote, and the difference is one point of white territory.

C. 1 point in gote




Black plays first




White plays first

This time Black 1 is gote; White ignores it because he has nothing further to lose. That is, even if White plays 1, he gets only the single point marked 'x' ('a' is not territory). This is the odd man out.

D. 1 point in sente



Black plays first




White plays first

Black 1 gains one point in sente. (If White ignores it, Black 2 gains a further point.) White 1 is gote.


Group 2. The odd man out is B.

A. 4 points in double sente

In the diagrams at the top of the next column, both Black 1 and 3 and White 1 and 3 are sente, and the difference is two points of territory on each side. Black 1 is worth four points in double sente.




Black plays first




White plays first

B. Almost nothing in double sente



Black plays first




White plays first


5: elsewhere

Although still double sente, Black 1 is not in the same class as the other moves of this group. The value of White 1 and 3 is reduced because they make Black 6 sente. The difference on the right edge is now only three points (x), and most of that gain is cancelled by the fact that White can later play 'a' or 'b' in the diagram at left, but not in the diagram at right. An exact value is hard to calculate (How much would White 'b' be worth?) but anyway, White or Black 1 is fairly small.

C. 4 points in double sente



Black plays first




White plays first


Essentially like move A in this group. Note that in both diagrams, 'a' is Black's sente for later.

D. 4 points in double sente

In the diagram at right at the top of the next page, White plays 1 in sente, then turns away, letting Black play 4. The difference is still four points, marked 'x', and both diagrams are sente.




Black plays first




*White plays first
3: elsewhere*

Group 3. The odd man out is D.

A. 5 points in reverse sente




Black plays first




*White plays first
3: elsewhere*

Black 1 at left is gote, and the 2—3 exchange is automatic later. White 1 at right is sente, and 4 is Black's sente later. Black 1 is thus reverse sente, gaining two prisoners (four points) plus one other point (x).

B. 5 points in reverse sente



Black plays first




*White plays first
3: elsewhere
5: connects*


Black 1 is gote, but White 1 is sente (threatens to kill). The triangled exchange in the diagram at left and the 4—5 exchange in the diagram at right are fair assumptions to make for later. The difference is three points of black territory — 'x' plus a white prisoner — but only two points of white territory because White has to connect at 5.

C. 5 points in reverse sente

This position too (top of next column) is gote for Black but sente for White, and the difference is the 5 points marked 'x'.




Black plays first




White plays first

D. 5 points in gote.



Black plays first




White plays first


Both Black and White 1 are gote, so this is the odd man out. The triangled exchanges are the standard counting assumptions. The difference is still five points, but the value is only half that of moves A to C.

Group 4. The odd man out is A.

A. 18 points in gote




*White plays first
2: elsewhere*




Black plays first

Three assorted prisoners and twelve more points (x) make eighteen: add it up.

B. 14 points in gote




White plays first




Black plays first

Black 1 takes four prisoners and saves six more points. White 1 forces him to actually capture the triangled stone.

C. 14 points in gote




White plays first
4: elsewhere




Black plays first
4: elsewhere

This time it's six prisoners and two more points. $(6 \times 2) + 2 = 14$. This problem is just a simple test of counting and arithmetic.

D. 14 points in gote.



White plays first
2: elsewhere



Black plays first

Four prisoners plus six more points. White 3 and 5 in the diagram at left can be assumed as White's sente after playing 1.

Page from Go History (continued)




Figure 4 (145 - 188)
ko: 78, 81, 84, 87

White finally throws in the towel after Black 188. This has been an unusually one-sided handicap game, with a rather lacklustre performance by White. Part of the problem was that he obviously underestimated his opponent, as shown by such overplays as 19, 49 and 87. Since Shunseki's heir, Shuntatsu, also lost to Yonaha, the occasion was a complete triumph for the visitors.

As mentioned earlier, Ryukyuan go players made no further visits to Edo, so this was the last international match of the Edo period.

This defeat was only one of three conspicuous setbacks in the career of poor Shunseki. There was his failure to get Hayashi Incho Monnyu made Meijin in 1742 (GW15), then later, in 1766 - 67, there came his ignominious loss to Honinbo Satsugen in their sogo for Meijin (GW16, 17). His place in Japanese go history is not a glorious one.

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
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
Go in Lilliput James Davies

If little has been heard from the island of Lilliput for the last 254 years, it may be because since Gulliver's visit, the inhabitants have been peacefully engaged in carrying out an exhaustive analysis of 7 x 7 go. The end of this project


is nowhere near in sight; the Lilliputians should be busy for centuries to come. The problems below are an interim sample of some of the tesujis, well-known and otherwise, that they have discovered.




1. Black to play and win.




2. White to play and win.



3. White to play and win.




4. Black to play and win.




5. Black to play and win.

ANSWERS

1. Answer. Black 1 sets a small trap. If White correctly avoids it, the game is over in three moves and Black wins with ten points of territory to White's nine. (If Black plays 1 at 3, White 1 leads to a draw.)




1. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: trap. If White resists at 1, Black springs the trap with 2. He has a perfect ko threat at 6. White has no answering ko threat, and cannot help losing four stones.

2. Answer. It all depends on how White links along the bottom edge. If he links smartly with 1 and 3 (in either order), Black can do no better than 4 and 6. White has nine points and Black can get no more than eight, so White wins. If Black plays 2 at 3, White plays 2, and if Black plays 4 at 5, White plays 4: no trap this time.




2. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: wrong. If White links up crudely like this, however, he gives Black the same tesuji (4) as in the first problem, and gets only a draw. White 1 at 2 is even worse.

3. Answer. White 1, 3, and 5 deprive Black of all territory along the right side, and despite Black 6, White will win by two points. By comparison, White 1 at 3 would lose by two points (Black 1), as would White 1 at 'a' (Black 2, White 3, Black 1).




3. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: variation. If Black plays 1, White links with 2. If Black 2, White 1.

4. Answer. To win, Black has to sacrifice an extra stone at 1. Then White cannot stop him from coming three stones down the side, and the final score is thirteen to twelve in Black's favor.




4. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: wrong. Black 1 by itself is not enough. White 2 secures fourteen points of territory; Black loses by one point.

5. Answer. Once again the winning move is a sacrifice. It forces White to seal his own fate by making a reply that Black can take advantage of. If White captures at 2, Black connects at 3 and wins the capturing race by one move.



5. Answer




Dia. 1


6: ko

Dia. 1: variation. If White connects at 1, Black moves in from the top right corner. The result is a ko, but White is two moves behind and has no ko threats.

Dia. 2: wrong. Black 3 after 1 is too late; now White connects at 4. Next comes Black 'a', White 'b', Black anywhere, White 'c', Black resigns.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3: wrong. If Black starts from the top right, then plays 3, White captures at 4. Now it's an eye against nothing — Black has no way to get White into atari and loses unconditionally.

Page from Go History

International Go in the Edo Period (iii) The Third Ryuku Mission

The third international match between Japan and the Ryukyus (Okinawa) took place in 1748, when another tributary mission visited Edo. This time the Ryukyu players applied to the Inoue house for games, rather than to the Honinbo house, presumably because the diploma issued to Yara no Satonoshi in 1710 had been signed by Inoue Dosetsu Inseki (see GW20).

Two Ryukyu go players were members of this mission: Tagami Peichin and Yonaha Satonoshi. Tagami played Inoue Shunseki Inseki 7-dan (1707 – 72), the 6th Inoue head and then the senior figure in the go world, on three stones and Yonaha played Shunseki's heir, Shuntatsu (1728 – 84), on four stones. The Ryukyuans won both games, thus avenging the defeats of their predecessors. Their triumph was the cause of some embarrassment to the Japanese, for Tagami promptly applied for a 5-dan diploma. While he was clearly stronger than either Peichin Hamahika or Yara no Satonoshi, this application, based after all on the result of just one game, was considered presumptuous and was rejected by Shunseki. However, the Shimazu clan, which 'sponsored' the Ryukyu missions, mediated and succeeded in obtaining him a 4-dan diploma.

After this victory Ryukyu players made no further visits to Japan, perhaps because they were satisfied with redeeming their honour on this third visit or perhaps because they thought they had little more to learn from the Japanese. Actually Japanese go was passing through a period of stagnation at this time (see GW16) and Shunseki was hardly of the same calibre as their earlier opponents, Dosaku and Dochi. Nevertheless, Shunseki took the liberty of placing himself on their level by signing the diploma issued to Tagami as 'national champion'.

Before looking at the Tagami – Shunseki game, here is a brief summary of international go in this period.

Between 1615 and 1623: Lee Yak See (Korea) lost to Sansa, 1st Honinbo, on three stones (game record not preserved).

1682: Peichin Hamahika (Ryukyu) played Dosaku, 4th Honinbo, on four stones, losing one game by 14 points (see GW18), but winning the other by 4 points. He received a 3-dan diploma.

1710: the fifteen year old Yara no Satonoshi lost on three stones to Dochi, 5th Honinbo (see 'Appreciating Famous Games'); lost on black to Aihara Kaseki, then twelve years old, by 2 points (GW20); received a 3-dan diploma.

1748: Tagami Peichin beat Shunseki, 6th Inoue, on three stones, received a 4-dan diploma; Yonaha Satonoshi beat Shuntatsu, later 7th Inoue, on four stones.

Tagami Peichin v. Shunseki

White: Inoue Shunseki Inseki, 6th Inoue

Black: Tagami Peichin (Ryukyu)

date: 25th December, 1748

played at the Edo residence of Lord Matsudaira of Satsuma

Commentary by Iwata Hajime 4-dan. (To the

best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed commentary on this game ever published).




Figure 1 (1 – 11)

Figure 1 (1 – 11)


Black 4. Black does not want to play at 'a', as White 'b' would be an ideal combination of pincer

and extension from 1. The modern approach would be to play 4 at 'c', but this move was not developed until more recent times.

Black 6 is too narrow. If Black wants to play at the bottom, the combination of 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 is preferable. Next best would be Black 'd', which would make good balance with the stones to the left. Alternatively, Black could play 'e' or 'f' on the left side.

Black 8. Black should defend solidly at 'g' and aim at invading on the right side. Black 8 in Figure 2 shows that Black knows this move.

Black 10. Black 'e' or 'f' is still better.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2 13: connects




Figure 2 (12 – 50)

Figure 2 (12 – 50)

Black 12. A good invasion point (the question of timing aside). Black 14 makes miai of 15 and 16, so Black is safe.

White 19 would not be played in an even game (White 'a' is usual), but White is sounding out his opponent.


Black 20 is the first genuinely bad move. Since the corner is open at 'b', Black 20 is almost worthless. The correct move at the top is 'c' or 'd'. However, the best move of all is the invasion

at 'a'; as Black is strong above and below, the fighting could not go badly for him. As a defensive move, fixing up his shape in the top right corner with 'e' takes priority over the top left corner. Strengthening Black there would make the white group below thin.


White 21 is a severe invasion. Since Black does not invade on the left side, White does not bother to defend.

Black 28 is correct. If Black 1 in Dia. 2, Black would be left with the defect at 6. If Black tries to kill White with 5, White counterattacks with 6 and wins the fight with the throw-in at 8.

Black 40. If Black tries to kill White, he still loses because of the squeeze — see Dia. 3.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4 17: connects

White 41 is the vital point. The question is why doesn't White cut at 44 and Dia. 4 provides the answer. The sequence there is long but all forced.

Black 42. Black cannot connect at 45, as White cuts at 44 and catches Black short of liberties.

White 49 looks severe, but is perhaps an over-play. His satisfactory result at the top seems to have encouraged White to try to take further advantage of his opponent's slack play. Instead of 49, White should defend the left side at 'f' and wait for a suitable opportunity. However, since his group at the top only has one eye, White presumably hopes to stabilise it through fighting.

Figure 3 (51 – 100)

White 59 is the vital point for eye-shape. White has to secure this group if he wants to fight in the centre. Looking after two weak groups would be too much.

White 65. To protect against Black 'a', White




Figure 3 (51 - 100)


'b', Black 65; if then White 'c', Black plays 'd', White 'e', Black 68. Making eyes in gote at the top would be painful, not to mention letting Black squeeze in the centre.

White 69 helps Black to make good shape with 70, but White is determined to keep Black separated.


Black 80. This leaves White with the atari at 'f', but Black does not want to lose sente defending. The counterattack of 1 in Dia. 5 does not work well for Black.

Dia. 5. Timing is important – when Black ataris at 3, White plays 4 and 6 in sente (if White 8 after 3, Black can atari at 6), then connects at 8. Next, he hanes at 10, then moves out with 12, developing a nice attack on Black's centre group.

When Black defends at 82, White must also defend at 83. However, once White adds this stone, defending the corner becomes unimportant for Black. Even if White plays 'f', then takes the corner, his gain is reduced as he has invested the extra stone at 83.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White 87 is an overplay which has traditionally been considered White's losing move. Black builds thickness with 88 and gets a nice attack going with 92 etc. At this stage White does not have the leisure to capture the two stones on the side anyway, so instead of 87 he should reinforce in the centre, for example, with 1 to 5 in Dia. 6.

Note that pushing up with White 87 at 98 does not work well, as after Black 'g', White 'h', Black 'i', White 'j', Black has a perfect answer at 'k'.

Black seizes the initiative firmly by attacking the centre group with 92 etc. and White is unable to get back in the game. He keeps on fighting for nearly another hundred moves, but the game has already been decided.




Figure 4 (101 - 144)

Concluded on page 60

